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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“…there was this pregnant woman who was about 9 months 
pregnant. She worked all day.  The babies who were born 
were usually born dead, but in this case the baby was born 
alive.  The baby was crying as it was born; we were so 
curious, this was the first time we saw a baby being born.  So 
we were watching this baby and we were so happy.  But 
suddenly we heard the footsteps.  The security agent came 
in and this agent of the Bowibu said that . . . usually when a 
baby is born we would wash it in a bowl of water, but this 
agent told us to put the baby in the water upside down.  So 
the mother was begging, ‘I was told that I would not be able 
to have the baby, but I actually got lucky and got pregnant 
so let me keep the baby, please forgive me,’ but this agent 
kept beating this woman, the mother who just gave birth.  
And the baby, because it was just born, it was just crying.  
And the mother, with her shaking hands she picked up the 
baby and she put the baby face down in the water.  The baby 
stopped crying.  We saw this water bubble coming out of the 
mouth of the baby.  And there was an old lady who helped 
with the labor, she picked up the baby from the bowl of 
water and left the room quietly.  So those kind of things 
repeatedly happened.  That was in the detention center in the 
city of Chongjin of Hamgyeong Province.”1 
“And you see babies with bloated stomachs. And we also 
cooked the snakes and the mouse to feed these babies and if 
there was a day that we were able to have mouse, there was 
a special diet for us.  And so we had to eat everything alive, 
every type of meat that we could find, anything that flew, 
that crawled on the ground.  Any grass that grew in the field, 
we had to eat. That’s the reality of the prison camp.”2 
                                                     
1 U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
DPRK, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights 
in the DPRK, para. 432, A.HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Detailed 
Findings]; U.N. Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK - Seoul Public 
Hearing Day 1 (PM) (Aug. 20, 2013) (02:42:00), http://webtv.un.org/search/ 
commission-of-inquiry-on-human-rights-in-the-dprk-seoul-public-hearing-day-1-
pm-20-august/2668611257001?term=%EA%B3%B5%EC%B2%AD%ED%9A%8C. 
2 UN Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK- Seoul Public Hearing 
Day 2 (AM) (Aug. 21, 2013) (00:31:50), http://webtv.un.org/search/         
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North Korea presents unique challenges for the international 
legal system.  Following the unhappy legacy of its long history and 
the Korean War’s aftermath, the country has been under the spell of 
one of the most unusual regimes in the world.3  Although the regime 
claims socialist ideals, it is accurate to characterise its ideology as 
being limited to “Kimjongism.”  For long, it has been reported that 
the regime has been engaging in human rights violations of the 
worst sort:   
extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, 
rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution 
on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible 
transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of 
persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing 
prolonged starvation.4   
Somewhere between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners are 
currently being detained in prison camps and subjected to 
starvation and other forms of torture.  Gender inequality is 
pervasive and women are vulnerable to trafficking and sexual 
exploitation.  Aside from indoctrination from an early age, children 
face starvation and other privations.5  Citizens and foreigners 
                                                     
commission-of-inquiry-on-human-rights-in-the-dprk-seoul-public-hearing-day-2-
am-21-august/2668611256001?term=%EA%B3%B5%EC%B2%AD%ED%9A%8C. 
3 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 85 (stating that “[t]he imposed 
division of the Korean peninsula, the massive destruction that occurred during the 
Korean War and the impact of the Cold War have engendered an isolationist mind-
set and a deep aversion to outside powers.”).  
4 Press Release, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, North 
Korea: UN Commission documents wide-ranging and ongoing crimes against 
humanity, urges referral to ICC (Feb. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E#sthash.
3UmQISxM.dpuf [hereinafter U.N. Commission Press Release]. 
5 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 542 (stating that “apart from killing 
many children, hunger and starvation have also had negative impacts on the long-
term development of infants and children.”).  Hunger and malnutrition continue to 
be widespread in DPRK because of the incompetence and inefficiency of the food 
delivery system and of the local markets.  According to the evidence, approximately 
twenty-seven percent of babies and young children in DPRK are stunted because 
of severe malnourishment on the part of their mothers during gestation.  These 
conclusions are demonstrated in the reports of impartial United Nations agencies 
(World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food 
Program) operating in the country. Id. para. 545.  The major burden of food scarcity 
falls on those citizens deemed “hostile” to the regime under the Songbun system of 
classification.  Doubtless this is the reason why DPRK refused access for normal 
monitoring of food aid, designed to assure donors of the impartiality of donated 
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continue to face abductions and disappearances at the hands of the 
state apparatus.  In the face of this persistent and horrific disregard 
for international law norms and institutions, and the continued 
commission of crimes against humanity, the international 
community has been largely rendered a spectator helplessly 
regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a 
conundrum for a legal system bereft of direct enforcement 
capability.   
For long, international responses have taken the form of a slew 
of UN resolutions6 and persistent name-calling:  the DPRK has been 
called a “rogue state” and a member of the “axis of evil”.7  Clearly, 
the resolutions have been ineffectual and there is not even 
agreement about what the pejorative terms designed to 
                                                     
food distribution.  Evidence is recorded in the COI’s report concerning luxury 
goods and extravagance by which the ruling elite live well whilst other citizens, less 
favoured, starve to death.  Id. para. 570. 
6 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993) (calling upon 
North Korea to honour its obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons treaty); S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006) (strongly 
urging North Korea to abandon nuclear programs and return to non-proliferation 
talks); S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) (demanding that North 
Korea abandon its nuclear programs, stating efforts to enforce that demand, and 
forming a committee of the Security Council to monitor those efforts); S.C. Res. 
1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) (recalling previous relevant provisions 
and reiterating provisions in singular resolution); S.C. Res. 1928, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1928 (June 7, 2010) (requesting that the Panel of Experts provide reports to 
the Council); S.C. Res. 1985, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1985 (June 10, 2011) (extending the 
Council’s request that the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council); S.C. Res. 
2050, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2050 (June 12, 2012) (extending the Council’s request that 
the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council); S.C. Res. 2087, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2087 (Jan. 22, 2013) (condemning North Korea’s nuclear launch and calling 
on Member States to enforce previous provisions); S.C. Res. 2094, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2094 (Mar. 7, 2013) (condemning North Korea’s nuclear launch and calling 
on Member States to enforce actions to prevent nuclear proliferation); and S.C. Res. 
2141, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2141 (Mar. 5, 2014) (extending the Council’s request that 
the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council).  For instance, the UN General 
Assembly resolution, dated December 18, 2014, which was adopted with 116 votes 
for, 20 against, and 53 abstentions, acknowledged that “crimes against humanity 
have been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to 
policies established at the highest level of the State for decades” and called on the 
Security Council to take “appropriate action to ensure accountability, including 
through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court.”  G.A. Res. 69/188, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/69/188 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
7 “The fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has for decades 
pursued policies involving crimes that shock the conscience of humanity raises 
questions about the inadequacy of the response of the international community.”  
U.N. Commission Press Release, supra note 4. 
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communicate deviant status actually mean or how to define a state 
as a pariah.  Coevally, a number of other terms such as renegade,8 
outcast,9 deviant,10 and recalcitrant are employed to refer to these 
states at different periods in time by political actors and scholars.  
Despite the serious challenges posed by such a state to international 
law, the phenomenon of the recalcitrant state has not received 
adequate study by scholars of international law.  Much less, the 
potency and relevance of international law in relation to such states 
remains under-theorized.  In this light, the establishment of the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights,11 and the publication of 
its widely endorsed report,12 offers an avenue for developing our 
understanding as to what to do about recalcitrant states such as the 
DPRK.   
There is a substantial and growing literature about the role of 
international human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in improving 
human rights conditions in countries.  These organizations adopt 
naming and shaming strategies to highlight rights violations, raise 
                                                     
8 MIROSLAV NINCIC, RENEGADE REGIMES (2007). 
9 EFRAIM INBAR, OUTCAST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1985). 
10 DEON GELDENHUYS, DEVIANT CONDUCT IN WORLD POLITICS (2004). 
11 The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) established the Commission of 
Inquiry (COI) by a resolution adopted on April 9, 2013.  See Situation of human 
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, G.A. Res. 22/13, paras. 3, 5, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013) (establishing that the HRC  
decides to establish, for a period of one year, a commission of inquiry 
comprising three members, one of whom should be the Special 
Rapporteur, with the other two members appointed by the President of 
the Human Rights Council . . . Further decides that the commission of 
inquiry will investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations 
of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as outlined 
in paragraph thirty-one of the report of the Special Rapporteur, including 
the violation of the right to food, the violations associated with prison 
camps, torture and inhuman treatment, arbitrary detention, 
discrimination, violations of freedom of expression, violations of the right 
to life, violations of freedom of movement, and enforced disappearances, 
including in the form of abductions of nationals of other States, with a 
view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations 
may amount to crimes against humanity . . . ). 
12 Contrary to the overwhelming consensus on the high quality report, A 
North Korean official termed the evidence “the fabricated testimonies of a handful 
of defectors who committed crimes and abandoned the country.”  Rick Gladstone, 
United Nations Urges North Korea Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/world/asia/north-korea-united-nations-icc-
human-rights-abuses.html?_r=0. 
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media and public awareness, and precipitate international action.13  
While they are not always successful,14 some evidence indicates that 
states targeted by these campaigns do improve their practices.15  For 
scholars who believe in the ability of human rights organizations to 
achieve positive change, the key is the utilization of shame16 to 
persuade the recalcitrant state that its actions might undermine its 
domestic and international legitimacy, or its aspirational self-image 
and identity.17  Alternatively, shaming might be effective by 
generating sufficient pressure on other members of the international 
community so that they are forced to take action against the 
                                                     
13 See Alison Brysk, From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International 
System, and Human Rights in Argentina, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 259–85 (Oct. 1993) 
(discussing the impact of the international system on social movements and change 
in Argentina).   
14 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human 
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 689–716 (2008) (documenting 
situations in which naming and shaming has proven successful). 
15 Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using Events 
Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 1 (2012) 
(“Improvements in human rights practices result from the interaction of shaming 
by HROs with: 1. Large number of HROs present within the state.  This domestic 
presence of HROs helps local social movements pressure their regime for improved 
human rights ‘from below’ (Brysk 1993).  2. Shaming of the regime by third-party 
states, individuals, and organizations. When third 
parties, citing the work of HROs, join advocacy efforts, the impact of HROs 
increases due to pressure ‘from above.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also James C. 
Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression 
in Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187, 187 (2008) (studying the response of Latin 
American governments who have been shamed for human rights violations). 
16 See June Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct 
Emotions?, 70 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1256, 1256 (1996) (studying the 
differences between shame, guilt, and embarrassment and finding that shame was 
no more likely than guilt to be experienced in public situations).  In subsequent 
work, Tangney et al. note that  
shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a 
negative evaluation of a specific behavior. Although this distinction may, 
at first glance, appear rather subtle, empirical research supports that this 
differential emphasis on self (“I did that horrible thing”) versus behavior 
(“I did that horrible thing”) sets the stage for very different emotional 
experiences and very different patterns of motivations and subsequent 
behavior.  
June Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 
349 (2007). 
17 See Thomas Risse & Kathyn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE, 1, 1-38 (1999) (exploring the 
impact of international human rights norms on several countries in different 
regions). 
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offender.18  The first pathway for affecting state behavior is not 
available when the offender is a state such as North Korea, and the 
second pathway is of unknown utility because self-image and 
identity can be highly subjective.  Moreover, shaming might have 
perverse consequences by bolstering domestic legitimacy and 
identity by casting the ruler as a victim of hostile external 
propaganda. Therefore, the international community’s toolkit is 
limited to the third pathway – pressuring law-abiding states to 
enforce international law norms against the offender – and we 
expand on the role of labelling and shaming to generate pressure 
under international law that may be applicable to such states, 
identifying its target and scope.  Thereafter, we consider some 
objections to shaming and posit that the Commission of Inquiry 
(COI) mechanism addresses many of the theoretical objections.  
First, the COI possesses both authority and legitimacy because it is 
established pursuant to a formal legal process and its work is subject 
to legal standards.  Although it is not a judicial tribunal, the COI 
provides robust procedural safeguards: a transparent methodology, 
acceptable standards of proof, due process rights to the accused, and 
a legal framework to assess violations committed by the offender.  
Second, the COI is a neutral and independent entity capable of 
making assessments about facts and determinations about 
violations of international law obligations without being tainted by 
partisanship.  Third, because the COI is not a judicial tribunal or a 
prosecutor, and the setting is not adversarial, there are incentives for 
the accused regime to participate in its work and contribute to the 
establishment of accurate facts.  Thereafter, it has the ability to take 
corrective action if blame is assessed, without the taint of legal 
liability, thereby achieving rehabilitation goals.  Fourth, because of 
the location of the COI within the UN architecture, shaming is 
addressed both to the offending regime and the other member 
states.  This is key to its authority—to assert legal authority delegated 
by member states pursuant to the organization’s constitutional 
documents and legal rules, to reiterate the binding nature of 
international law norms to participants and observers and thereby 
deter other potential offenders, and to ensure that law-abiding states 
take action against violators.  Having subscribed to an 
                                                     
18 See James Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame, The Condemnation of 
Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 861, 861 (Dec. 2006) 
(analyzing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ targeting and 
punishment of countries who violated human rights norms). 
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organization’s charter and consented to binding legal obligations, 
states do not have the luxury of claiming that they are unaware of 
violations or that the facts have not been independently assessed.  
Therefore, states cannot resort to responsibility-shifting and free-
riding after a well-publicized report issued by a UN agency if they 
expect the international legal order to hold.  As the COI said to the 
Human Rights Council (HRC) at the time of presentation of the COI 
report concerning the risk of inaction by way of follow up:  “[n]ow, 
we cannot say we do not know about DPRK.  Now we all know and 
there is no excuse.”  In March 2014, in answer to the demand by the 
DPRK ambassador in Geneva that the international community 
should “mind its own business,” the COI told members of the UN 
Security Council in New York:  “[these] crimes are indeed the 
world’s ‘business’ and the world is watching.  Respectfully, if this is 
not a case for action by the Security Council, it is hard to image one 
that ever would be.”19 
The paper is organized as follows.  Part II details the work of the 
Commission of Inquiry, its methodology, and key findings.  Part III 
outlines a theoretical model for shaming and labelling in 
international law, considers several objections, and makes a novel 
normative argument for a greater utilization of the COI procedure 
in international law.  Part IV concludes. 
 
2.  THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
 
The COI on human rights in the DPRK was established by a 
resolution of the HRC of the United Nations on 21 March 2013.20  The 
resolution was adopted without dissent or call for a vote.  It reflected 
the growing exasperation of the international community over the 
refusal of the government of DPRK to permit the entry of, or to 
engage with, officials of the UN human rights system, including the 
Special Rapporteur designated by the HRC to investigate and report 
on human rights in the country.21  Although DPRK had ratified four 
                                                     
19 Address by the Chair of the COI on DPRK to the members of the Security 
Council, unpublished, 17 April 2014, New York. 
20 G.A. Res. 22/13, supra note 11.  
21 There have been two Special Rapporteurs on North Korea: Professor Vitit 
Muntarbhorn (Thailand) and Mr Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia).  The latter, still 
in office, was also a member of the COI in accordance with the mandate of the HRC. 
As the COI notes 
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major UN human rights treaties, it had unsuccessfully sought to 
withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).22  In 2013, it had refused to accept a single 
recommendation for improvement in its human rights situation, 
made during its first participation in the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) in 2009–10.23  No other member state of the United Nations 
has had such a lamentable record of non-cooperation.  
 
                                                     
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea has not had access to the country since the 
inception of the mandate in 2004. . . . not a single mandate holder of the 
Human Rights Council has been invited, or permitted, to visit the DPRK . 
. . the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
have also issued periodic reports detailing human rights violations and 
related impunity in the DPRK. The DPRK has not provided substantive 
input to these reports since it has rejected the underlying resolutions of 
the General Assembly and Human Rights Council. 
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 11-12. 
22 It was informed, on the basis of the advice of the UN General Counsel, that 
there was no authority to withdraw.  It accepted that advice and continued 
engagement. 
23 See generally G.A. Res. 67/L.50, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/67/L.50 (Nov. 9, 2012) 
(expressing concern of North Korea’s violation of and strongly urging North Korea 
to respect human rights).  The UNHRC Resolution of 2013 in its preamble expressed 
its serious concern at the refusal of the government of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to articulate, by the time of the adoption by the 
Human Rights Council of the outcome report of its universal periodic 
review in March 2010, which recommendations enjoyed its support, and 
regretting the lack of action taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea to date to implement the recommendations of that report. 
G.A. Res. 22/13, supra note 11. See also Press Release, Pillay urges more attention to 
human rights abuses in North Korea, calls for international inquiry (Jan. 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/                
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12923&LangID=E (calling for international inquiry 
into the human rights abuses occurring in North Korea).  The Universal Periodic 
Review of North Korea conducted in 2009–10 resulted in over one hundred 
recommendations to improve human rights, but North Korea refused to identify 
one recommendation it would implement.  See Press Release, Human Rights 
Council adopts outcomes of Universal Periodic Review on Bhutan, Dominica and 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www. 
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9921&LangID=
E (noting that the Council urged North Korea to implement the recommendations).  
In November 2012, a North Korean delegate to the UN called “the report of the 
special rapporteur . . . a product of the hostile policies of the United States and 
European Union against the DPRK (North Korea) and is a typical example of 
politicization, double standards and selectivity on the issue of human rights.”  Jo 
Yong-Hak, North Korea Says Proud of its Human Rights Record, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2012, 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE8A11F120121103.   
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The COI members included the current Special Rapporteur (Mr. 
Marzuki Darusman, Indonesia), together with Ms. Sonja Biserko (a 
Serbian human rights expert), and one of the authors of this article 
(Justice Kirby).  The latter two members were appointed by the 
President of the HRC in May 2013.  The Special Rapporteur served 
ex-officio.  
It is important to note that a COI of the HRC is independent of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).  
It is required to be independent not only of the High Commissioner 
but of the HRC and of all extraneous influences.  The commissioners 
of the COI were not acting as United Nations judges or prosecutors.  
Their duty was to the mandate given to the COI by the HRC and 
their role was as expert factfinders, with a duty to report to the HRC 
in accordance with its resolution.  In the case of the DPRK, that 
resolution identified nine separate subject matters of human rights 
upon which a report was required.24  It also instructed the COI to 
document human rights violations, victim and perpetrator accounts, 
and to ensure accountability for such wrongs.25  The COI was 
obliged to report to the HRC by March 2014.26  Although the time 
under report was not specified, it potentially extended back to the 
foundation of the DPRK, as a result of an artificial border imposed 
by the victorious Allies upon the Korean peninsula at the conclusion 
of the Second World War.27  That border terminated more than a 
                                                     
24 The nine matters identified were: violations associated with prison camps; 
violations of thought, expression and religion; arbitrary arrest and detention; 
violations of the right to food; discrimination and, in particular, systemic denial and 
violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; violations to the right 
to life; violations of the freedom of individual movement; and enforced 
disappearances, including abductions of foreign nationals. Detailed Findings, supra 
note 1, at 6-7. 
25 The COI report notes the following objectives: “(a) Further investigating and 
documenting human rights violations; (b) Collecting and documenting victim and 
perpetrator accounts; (c) Ensuring accountability.”  Detailed Findings, supra note 1, 
para. 15. 
26 UN Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/22/13, 9 April 2013, 
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/128/65/ 
PDF/G1312865.pdf?OpenElement (“Requests the commission of inquiry to present 
an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-fourth session and to the 
General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, and a written report to the Council at 
its twenty-fifth session.”) 
27 The mandate did not specify a geographic boundary either: “Commission 
has interpreted its mandate to include alleged violations perpetrated by the DPRK 
against its nationals both within and outside the DPRK as well as those violations 
that involve extraterritorial action originating from the DPRK, such as the 
abductions of non-DPRK nationals.” Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 19. 
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thousand years of united government, including 34 years (1911–
1945) under Japanese imperial rule. 
The commissioners’ made a decision to gather testimony by 
public hearings thereby imposing novel burdens both on the 
commissioners and the secretariat.  However, the COI, with the 
support of the secretariat, brought its report to completion on time.  
Effectively, although the first substantive meeting of the COI was 
held at the beginning of July 2013, the report was written and 
finalised by the end of January 2014.  It was published online on 17 
February 2014.28  It was formally presented to the HRC in Geneva 
on 17 March 201429 and to members of the Security Council (SC) in 
New York on 17 April 2014.30  
The COI’s pathbreaking work included the testimony of Shin 
Dong-hyuk, the only person known to have escaped political prison 
camp number 14 into which he was born as the child of adult 
prisoners confined there.  Other potent testimony was given by a 
witness who saw a baby of a refugee required to be drowned in a 
bucket because of objections to the Chinese ethnicity of its father.  
This was regarded as contaminating “pure” Korean blood. A 
witness from a family of persons abducted under the DPRK’s state 
policy of abducting Republic of Korea (ROK), Japanese, and other 
nationals deemed useful to the DPRK regime also provided 
testimony.  The COI’s report attracted unprecedented international 
media attention and focused states’ attention on horrific 
international crimes against humanity. 
 
2.1. The COI’s Methodology 
 
At the first in-person meeting of the Commissioners in Geneva 
in early July 2013, a full day was devoted to adopting a methodology 
                                                     
28 Detailed Findings, supra note 2. 
29 For the full chronology of events see Sec. Council, DPRK (North Korea) 
Chronology of Events (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ 
chronology/dprk-north-korea.php. 
30 The Report was transmitted by the Permanent Representatives of Australia, 
France, and the United States by way of a letter addressed to the President of the 
Security Council.  U.N. S.C., transmitted by letter dated Apr. 14, 2014 from the 
Permanent Representatives of Australia, France, and the United States of America 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2014/276 (Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport. 
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2014_276.pdf. 
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for the working of the COI.31  This was especially important because 
the DPRK communicated to the President of the Human Rights 
Council that it “totally and categorically rejects the Commission of 
Inquiry”32 and repeatedly refused to cooperate with the COI.33  In 
order to respond to this attitude, the COI had to adopt a novel, 
transparent, and innovative methodology: public hearings.34  This 
methodology is not common to UN inquiries, the one exception 
being the COI on the Occupied Territories, chaired by a former 
judge of common law background (Justice Richard Goldstone of 
South Africa).  
The Commissioners determined that the COI’s process must be 
transparent in order to counteract the inevitable attacks and 
criticisms that would follow concerning the truthfulness and 
representativity of the witnesses giving testimony to the COI.  They 
resolved that the collection of testimony at public hearings would 
be the centrepiece of their inquiry.  There were collateral advantages 
to public hearings: they would raise public consciousness of the 
suffering of the victims; establish the duration, nature, variety and 
intensity of their burdens; and it would help engage the national and 
international media during the conduct of the inquiry.  All of these 
intuitive judgements of the COI proved to be correct. 
At the onset, the COI distributed public calls for evidence.  In the 
available time, its secretariat interviewed more than 240 witnesses.  
In recognition of the fact that most of the witnesses were refugees 
                                                     
31 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 12–20 (detailing the development 
of the methodology for the COI and how it was implemented). 
32 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 21. 
33 The HRC resolution establishing the COI urged the Government of DPRK 
to cooperate fully with the Commission’s investigation; to permit the members of 
the COI unrestricted access to visit the country; and to provide them with all 
information necessary to enable them to fulfil their mandate.  At the very 
beginning, the DPRK stated publicly that it would “totally reject and disregard” the 
resolution.  It claimed that this was “a product of political confrontation and 
conspiracy”.  Michael Kirby, Moment of truth for North Korea over human rights, CNN 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/opinion/north-korea-un-
resolution-kirby/.  
34 Secretariat members in the DPRK COI (most of whom came from civilian 
legal backgrounds) expressed some reasonable hesitations and concerns about the 
proposed methodology.  There was anxiety about the effective protection of the 
identity and safety of witnesses; about maintaining security for the COI itself and 
its personnel, as well as for witnesses and deponents; about preventing possible 
disruption of hearings and meetings; about procuring, assembling and delivering 
witnesses according to the comprehensive hearing timetable; about obtaining 
suitable facilities outside national government premises (which were considered 
inappropriate); and about the cost implications thought likely to arise. 
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who had fled DPRK but had family living in that country, a majority 
were not permitted to offer public testimony in order to ensure 
compliance with the mandate instruction that no harm came to 
witnesses.  Their evidence was then received in a private and 
confidential setting.  However, other witnesses (some 84) gave 
evidence in public.  In a few cases physical disguises were adopted.  
In others, great care was taken to avoid, by public questioning, 
inessential identification of places and of people who might be 
harmed.  The DPRK news bureau described the witnesses as 
“human scum”.35  Although one or two witnesses may have 
occasionally added a gloss to their testimony, overwhelmingly they 
were judged by the COI to be truthful and convincing witnesses.  
When they were attacked by DPRK, the COI was able to invite 
everyone with access to the internet (which excluded most citizens 
in DPRK where such access is prohibited) to view the testimony 
online and to reach their own conclusions.36   
The COI also had constant contact with the DPRK missions in 
Geneva and New York.  Repeatedly, the COI invited participation 
in the hearings; commentary and correction of the draft report when 
completed; an opportunity, when the report was produced, to travel 
to DPRK to brief officials and citizens on its content; and to answer 
questions.37  Eventually, the final report was supplied to the 
Supreme Leader of DPRK (Kim Jong-un), repeating the foregoing 
offers and concluding with a warning about his own possible future 
personal responsibility under international criminal law.38  Such 
                                                     
35 Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, Questions and Answers on the Report of the United Nations Commission of 
Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 5 (Feb. 17, 
2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ 
HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/coi-dprk-q-and-a.pdf (noting that news reports 
called the public hearings “slander” and the participants “human scum”). 
36 To view the testimony online see Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Public Hearings, http://www. 
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/PublicHearings.aspx (listing 
the documents containing testimony from the public hearings). 
37 Press Release, OHCHR, UN Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea Set to 
Begin Hearings in Japan (Aug. 23, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13653&LangID=E#sthash.
PJmEOF9l.dpuf (noting the schedule and structure of the public hearings in Japan). 
38 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
DPRK, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights 
in the DPRK, Annex I, A.HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014) (including a letter submitted to 
His Excellency detailing the findings of the Commission and the potential 
ramifications under international law) [hereinafter Detailed Findings II]. 
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letters were ignored or, where answered, replied to with a reminder 
of the DPRK’s determination of non-engagement.   
Specifically, the COI invited DPRK to send a representative to 
the public hearings.  It offered to permit that representative to make 
submissions and to call testimony on its behalf.  It indicated that 
such a representative could, with leave, question witnesses.  
Arrangements were made with ROK to accord any such 
representative(s), nominated by DPRK, diplomatic immunity.  No 
such representation was arranged by DPRK.  It is unknown 
whether, amongst the members of the public attending the hearings 
of the COI, DPRK arranged for participation or representation 
anonymously.  Because the elite in DPRK has access to the internet, 
it must be assumed that they, and government agents in and outside 
North Korea, would have had full access to the entirety of the public 
hearings held by the COI.   
The public hearings of the COI took place in Seoul, ROK (August 
2013); Tokyo, Japan (August 2013); London, UK (October 2013) and 
Washington, DC (October 2013).39  The grouping of public hearings 
was arranged partly to save costs.  Officers of the secretariat visited 
the venues in advance of the COI Commissioners so as to interview 
and arrange witnesses for the hearings.  All testimony (for public 
and confidential consideration) was made available to the 
Commissioners.  The responsibility of eliciting the evidence in 
public fell on the Commissioners, primarily by questions addressed 
from the chair.  Witnesses were taken through statements provided 
by the secretariat, using non-leading questions so as to permit the 
witnesses to give their evidence in their own words.  Subsequently, 
the report of the COI contained on most pages references to 
testimony and small extracts from the transcript of actual evidence.  
These extracts are generally expressed in much more direct and 
                                                     
39 The COI methodology proves that, in today’s world, no country can entirely 
exclude itself from investigation by the human rights organs of the world 
community.  If the door is slammed shut by violators, investigation can take place 
outside the territory in question, drawing upon refugees who are pre-vetted to 
ensure that they are genuine, reliable and not unduly biased as a result of any 
ordeal they may have suffered. Notably, the COI also sought to visit China but the 
request was rebuffed: “On 20 November 2013, the Permanent Mission informed the 
Secretariat that, given China’s position on country-specific mandates, especially on 
the Korean peninsula, it would not be possible to extend an invitation to the 
Commission.”  Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 45. 
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vivid language than expert chroniclers usually produce.  They gave 
voice to the actual lived experiences of victims.40   
The report also demonstrates two features as a result of this 
procedure of uploading digital images of witnesses and transcripts 
(in the English, Korean and Japanese languages) on the COI website.  
First, as demonstrated by Holocaust studies, gathered after 1945, 
victims often feel guilty about surviving when so many friends and 
family have perished.  Whilst they are naturally upset and angry, 
once they begin recounting their stories, they normally follow their 
own chronological course.  Normally, they are remarkable for their 
clarity and understatement.  Second, the horrors recounted do not 
require exaggeration in order to have an impact.  The low-key way 
in which the testimony was ordinarily given by the witnesses before 
the COI made it all the more impressive.   
 
2.2. The Conduct of Public Hearings 
 
The COI’s decision to conduct public hearings raised both 
process and substantive questions in relation to witnesses. For 
instance, there were questions about the reliability of witnesses 
given that a majority (experts apart) were refugees who had already 
made a decision to leave DPRK.  One of the concerns was that the 
testimony of the witnesses was out of date and therefore unhelpful.41  
Furthermore, there was no shortage of witnesses: in ROK there are 
over 26,000 refugees from DPRK and significant numbers are also 
present in other countries.  Many of these refugees were willing to 
come forward and offer testimony, raising questions about how to 
select witnesses and complete the work within time.  In the end, the 
COI had to terminate the flow of witnesses so as to concentrate on 
selecting, and analysing, a representative sample who could speak 
to the nine-point mandate given by the HRC. 
In assessing reliability of witness testimony, the COI adopted a 
two-part test: first, a judgement based on impressions of credibility 
and non-exaggeration; and second, corroboration by other 
witnesses unknown to the person giving testimony, including 
effective corroboration by satellite images and documentation 
                                                     
40 This technique brings the report of the COI on DPRK to life.  It makes it a 
much more readable document than most UN reports. 
41 This is because enhanced barriers at the borders between DPRK and China 
have reduced the flow of asylum seekers into China since 2012. 
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available, both from DPRK itself and from UN and other agencies 
operating in DPRK (such as World Food Program (WFP)).42 
Crucially, facts about the persecution of religious minorities are, to 
some extent, confirmed by published official data on religious 
adherents, deriving from DPRK records.43  Similarly, statements 
about the pernicious Songbun system of social caste are confirmed 
by speeches by DPRK officials, including successive Supreme 
Leaders.  Remarkably, those leaders appear to be proud, and not 
ashamed, of labelling people at their birth with a social caste 
(classified as ‘core’, ‘wavering,’ and ‘hostile’ classes), upon the basis 
of which opportunities for education, housing, employment, 
political advancement, and food accessibility are decided.   
The legal framework for the COI’s work was provided by the 
international law instruments voluntarily entered into by the DPRK.  
Specifically, obligations under the ICCPR, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) provided legal content in order to assess the DPRK’s 
responsibility.44  In relation to crimes against humanity, the Rome 
                                                     
42 The following considerations were taken into account in assessing 
credibility:  
(a) the witness’s political and personal interests, potential biases and past 
record of reliability (if known); (b) the witness’s apparent capacity to 
correctly recall events, considering his or her age, trauma, how far back 
the events occurred, etc.; (c) the position of the witness in relation to the 
subject of the information; (d) where and how the witness obtained the 
information; and (e) the reasons for which the witness provided the 
information. 
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 73. 
43 The COI made a distinction between information and testimony: “any piece 
of information had to be assessed for its validity by considering, amongst other 
factors, the information’s relevance to the inquiry, its internal consistency and 
coherence, its logicality and its consistency with and corroboration by other 
information.”  Id. para. 74. 
44 Article 18 of the ICCPR providing for the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and article 20 were relevant for allegations about the 
indoctrination of citizens; articles 19 and 22 were relevant for assessing violations 
of the right to freedom of speech, expression, and association.  See International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 18, 19, 20, and 22, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(Mar. 23, 1976) (including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, 
speech, expression and association).  Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) were also relevant in the context of children.  See 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Feb. 16, 2005) (recognizing 
the same rights for children). 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and customary 
international law provided content. 
The COI accepted for itself a rigorous standard of proof, 
common to United Nations COIs of reported human rights 
violations.45  It accepted the “reasonable grounds for belief” 
standard.  It judged available testimony against the legal obligations 
binding on the DPRK as a State Party to the United Nations Charter 
and to international human rights treaties and as a State subject to 
customary international law.46  The COI made a conclusion that a 
fact was established when “it was satisfied that it had obtained a 
reliable body of information, consistent with other material, based 
on which a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would have 
reason to believe that such an incident or pattern of conduct had 
occurred.”47 
Where there was any doubt or uncertainty as to any finding or 
conclusion (as in the suggested deployment in and by DPRK of 
chemical weapons), the COI refrained from expressing a final 
conclusion, leaving several matters of that kind for the future.  
Similarly, where international law was in a possible state of 
evolution (as in the possible availability of the international crime of 
genocide in cases of annihilation of a section of the population on 
grounds of political belief48) the COI held back from expressing a 
conclusion on the possible infringement of such a law.49  
Notably, due to the fierce propaganda contest that exists in and 
near the Korean peninsula, care had to be taken in the use of media 
reports and in accepting the official positions of affected 
                                                     
45 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 63–78 (detailing the legal framework 
and standard of proof for the Commission). 
46 Id. paras. 63–64 (recognizing the legal obligations DPRK assumed as a State 
Party to treaties, as well as binding customary international law). 
47 As the COI’s Detailed Findings note, “[t]his standard of proof is lower than 
the standard required in criminal proceedings to sustain an indictment, but is 
sufficiently high to call for further investigations into the incident or pattern of 
conduct and, where available, initiation of the consideration of a possible 
prosecution.” Id. para. 68.   
48 Id. paras. 1155–59 (describing how the human rights abuses in North Korea 
are similar to the accepted definition of genocide). 
49 However, it did indicate its inclination in that respect.  There was already so 
much material (and findings on so many human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity) that this principle of prudent restraint appeared to be 
appropriate.  Id. para. 1158 (“The Commission is sympathetic to the possible 
expansion of the current understanding of genocide.  However, in light of finding 
many instances of crimes against humanity, the Commission does not find it 
necessary to explore these theoretical possibilities here”). 
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governments.  For instance, widespread reports that following his 
execution in December 2013, the uncle of the Supreme Leader, Jang 
Sung-thaek had been fed to wild dogs, were eventually traced to a 
Chinese social media source.  It was a fictitious rumour.  So was a 
report that the former girlfriend of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong-
un had been executed by firing squad in connection with indecent 
behaviour.  In May 2014 she appeared in a television program 
praising the Supreme Leader.  The COI kept an appropriate distance 
from the governments of concerned countries and was 
appropriately sceptical of Korean and other news reports. 
In accordance with its mandate, the COI was also extremely 
careful to attend to its duties to undertake proper recordkeeping, 
protection of the confidentiality and identity of victims, and the safe 
archiving of its materials.50  On the recommendations of the COI, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights was urged to continue the 
collection of evidence and to establish a secure archive for the safe-
keeping of all information gathered by, or for, the COI.51 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 There were no significant breaches of confidentiality and security affecting 
witnesses, either in the public hearings of the COI or otherwise.  Special assistance 
was provided by United Nations Security for the conduct of the public hearings 
and in the COI’s movements between venues.  Only on two occasions during the 
public hearings was anything said, or revealed, which was of potential 
embarrassment.  A firm instruction from the chair had the effect of curtailing media 
reportage of that item and the transcript and record were redacted to delete the 
identifiers.  There was no disruption of public hearings or any instance of undue 
danger nor concern on the part of witnesses.  One witness who later saw the report 
of the COI, suggested that the editing of the report of that person’s testimony had 
potentially given an incorrect impression of what was said.  Although it was not 
possible later to edit or amend the published report of the COI to meet this concern, 
a letter was given to the witness by the COI affirming the full detail of what had 
been said, as appearing in the official transcript.  The existence of the transcript, and 
its broad availability, provided a proper protection for the witness.  Id. para. 13 
(describing the mandate of the Commission). 
51 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 94(d); see also U.N. H.R.C. Res. 
25/CRP.1, supra note 2, para. 1225(d) (“The High Commissioner for Human Rights 
should continue the OHCHR’s engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea”).  After the report of the COI was delivered, an agreement was announced 
in May 2014, between OHCHR and the Government of ROK, for the establishment 
in ROK, as recommended by the COI, of a field office, inter alia to continue the 
collection and recording of testimony by victims of human rights abuse in DPRK. 
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2.3. Participation of Non-State Actors 
 
Because of its small secretariat and limited budget, the COI on 
DPRK had to secure a measure of assistance and support from 
outsiders.  These included government agencies, and   there were 
numerous meetings throughout the COI process with 
representatives of the governments of interested countries.52  
International human rights agencies proved invaluable in 
providing testimony; affording contact with victims; making 
submissions to the COI; supporting side events at the HRC, GA and 
SC; and participating in, and stimulating, the drafting of United 
Nations resolutions and procuring follow up to the COI report.53  
HRW played an important role in ceaselessly advocating the 
creation of the COI.54  Similarly, AI facilitated contact with expert 
and other witnesses, particularly in London and Washington, DC.  
It provided the COI with satellite imagery that was important to 
contradict DPRK’s assertion that there were no political prison 
camps in North Korea.  
The COI also made contact during its investigations, including 
following delivery of its report, with international think tanks, such 
as the Robert Kennedy Foundation in Washington, DC.55 
                                                     
52 Although DPRK itself refused repeated requests to engage with it, the COI 
called on (and reported progress to) the governments of Australia, China, France, 
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Lao DPR, the Russian Federation, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  In ROK, Japan, 
the UK and US, the Commission made contact with national bodies concerned with 
particular aspects of the mandate and representatives of victims and their families.  
These bodies played a useful role in stimulating attention to the condition of human 
rights in DPRK when (as is often the case), the record tends to lapse for want of up-
to-date information. 
53 In addition to HRW and AI, the International Commission of Jurists and the 
International Service for Human Rights provided valuable assistance. Detailed 
Findings, paras. 49-50. 
54 William Cornforth, North Korea: Launch a UN Commission of Inquiry, UN 
Investigation Needed to Document “Systematic and Egregious” Rights Abuses, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/21/north-
korea-launch-un-commission-inquiry. 
55 After the report was delivered, the COI made contact with The Graduate 
Institute Geneva, the Geneva Academy of International and Humanitarian Law, the 
Asser Institute in the Netherlands and The Hague Academy for Global Justice, as 
well as the Gresham College in London.  Engagement was likewise made with the 
Holocaust Museum and Brookings Institution (Washington DC) and with the 
Council on Foreign Relations (New York), coinciding with the COI briefing to 
members of the Security Council.  Following the delivery of the COI report, contact 
has been established with international bodies of lawyers, such as LAWASIA and 
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2.4. The Contribution of International Scholars 
 
An enormous literature has developed, especially in recent 
years,56 concerning DPRK.  There are notable well-respected 
scholars whose writings assisted the COI, including Professor 
Andrei Lankov (ROK and Australia),57 Professor Leonid Petrov 
(Australia) and Professor Victor Cha (US).58  An important part of 
the work of the Commissioners and secretariat involved absorbing 
this large body of information and opinion, whilst continuing to 
move forward with the preparation of the report in what was 
effectively little more than half a year of real time.   
One matter upon which dialogue with the jurists was especially 
helpful concerned the ambit of the international crime of 
“genocide.”59  In international law, genocide has been defined as 
including various grave and violent acts committed “with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such.”60  The COI received submissions urging a finding 
of genocide against DPRK.  Certainly, because of strong testimony 
that indicated violent acts in political prison camps and conduct that 
resulted, deliberately or recklessly, in many deaths from starvation, 
affecting at least hundreds of thousands of DPRK citizens, a 
conclusion that a type of genocide had occurred appeared open.  The 
difficulty was the emphasis which the crime of genocide had 
hitherto taken from “national, ethnical, racial or religious” 
                                                     
the International Bar Association (IBA), universities and concerned NGOs in ROK 
and the Asia Society and United Nations Association in the United States of 
America. 
56 See generally DANIELLE CHUBB, CONTENTIOUS ACTIVISM & INTER-KOREAN 
RELATIONS (2014) (analyzing recent North Korea-South Korea relations). 
57 See generally ANDREI LANKOV, THE REAL NORTH KOREA: LIFE AND POLITICS IN 
THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA (2013) (providing an overview of the politics, 
government and foreign relations of DPRK); Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para. 
592–593. 
58 See generally VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH KOREA, PAST AND 
FUTURE (2012) (describing the country, its secrecy, and the factors that have allowed 
the regime to persist for so long). 
59 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1155 (raising the question of whether 
a genocide has occurred in DPRK). 
60 Id. para. 1156 (citing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and including international law’s definition of genocide); see also 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing the International Criminal Court). 
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motivations of violators and the doubts that existed that such 
specific motivations existed in the case of DPRK.   
To be sure, the extension of the crime of genocide to include 
extermination on religious grounds was originally affected by the 
classification of the extermination of Jews in Europe in the 1930s-40s 
as ‘genocide’.  In the case of these victims, the motives were 
commonly both ethnic and religious.  However, religion is not an 
inbuilt personal characteristic of human beings as racial and like 
characteristics are.  It is a set of convictions, spiritual beliefs and 
philosophical/moral commitments that are acquired after birth – 
mostly in childhood or sometimes later in life.  In this respect, the 
religious ground for the crime of genocide appears analogous in 
some ways to a suggested political ground, which would certainly 
have been applicable in the case of possible exterminations by 
DPRK.  Although there was some evidence before the COI of 
possible extermination of civilians on religious grounds, said for 
example to be evidenced by the huge drop in the number of 
Christian adherents in North Korea identified on the DPRK’s own 
statistics, the evidence of this respect was ambiguous.  It was an 
insufficient foundation for a finding of genocide.61  
The COI members expressed themselves as sympathetic to a 
reconfiguration of the controlling definition of “genocide” in 
international customary law, so that it would include political 
grounds by analogy with religious grounds.62  However, the COI did 
                                                     
61 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para. 1159 (“[T]he Commission was 
not in a position to gather enough information to make a determination.”).  While 
there was undoubted evidence that the religiously-observant population in DPRK 
had fallen from about twenty-three percent at partition of the peninsula in 1945 to 
less than one percent in recent times, the COI was not convinced that it had been 
proved that this was by reason of extermination of that population. It was possible 
that the large decline in the Christian community in DPRK was a result of official 
discouragement and propaganda rather than extermination.  The COI could not be 
sure and held back on a finding.   
62 See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of 
the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (arguing that the 
COI’s approach is prudent because of the division of the international community 
on the issue, demonstrated in the negotiations of the Genocide Convention and the 
addition of the category of “Ethnical Group” as a means to ‘extend protection to 
doubtful cases’); see also U.N. Sixth Comm., Oct. 15, 1948, UNDOC A/C, 6/SR.75 
(outlining how the committee divided on that issue 18 in favour, 17 against, 11 
abstentions.  “Political groups” were included in the text of the draft convention 
until very late in its gestation but eventually withdrawn by consensus); HIRAD 
ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 
1412 (2008) (finding that in the creation of new crimes—including new international 
crimes—an approach of restraint is justifiable, for such developments have a 
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not feel obliged, or justified, to make conclusive findings on that 
basis, being convinced that there was ample proof of many “crimes 
against humanity.”  Resolution of the issue of law involved in the 
disputable definition of “genocide” was therefore unnecessary to 
reach a conclusion for the COI’s report.63   
As the COI emphasised, crimes against humanity, in themselves, 
are so grave as to initiate the responsibility of the state concerned 
(and in default the international community) to protect the actual 
and potential victims and to hold the perpetrators accountable 
under international law.64  
One of the specific recommendations of the COI on DPRK was 
that the situation in the country should be referred by the Security 
Council to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Such a reference 
would be necessary under the Rome Statute65 because DPRK is 
(perhaps not unexpectedly) not a party to the Rome Statute and 
hence is not otherwise amenable to its jurisdiction.  In its report, the 
COI examined various other possible ways of ensuring 
accountability for the crimes against humanity that it had found 
and, in respect of which, DPRK afforded no protection or redress to 
its own people.  Such failure would appear to enliven the 
responsibility of the international community, in the case of DPRK, 
to protect (Responsibility to Protect (R2P)) the people of DPRK from 
                                                     
consequence analogous to the imposition of retrospective criminal liability, which 
international human rights law resists).  
63 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1158 (emphasizing that all of the 
crimes against humanity found in the DPRK are grave crimes that trigger an 
international response). 
64 However, what is distinctive about “genocide” is that the Genocide 
Convention, recognised as a source of customary international law, imposes an 
obligation on all states to prevent the relevant acts and defaults.  It thus goes beyond 
the obligation to protect.  Arguably, it involves even more clearly the duty of 
collective action for which the Security Council derives special responsibilities 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.  Compare Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, available at 
https://www.icrc. 
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005
FB3E5&action=openDocument (detailing methods to prevent genocide) with 
Charter of the U.N. Charter ch. VII (explaining measures to be taken by the Security 
Council to prevent threats to peace).    
65 See Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 13(b) (finding that the ICC would have 
jurisdiction if a “situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council.”).  Cf. Detailed 
Findings, supra note 1, para. 1201(1) (“The Security Council could refer the situation 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court 
based on article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”). 
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such crimes.  All of the other options considered by the COI were, 
for the reasons given in the COI report, less suitable or desirable.66 
 
2.5. Findings 
 
The COI produced its report on time, within budget, and 
unanimously.  The report was publicly released on 17 February 2014 
in Geneva.67  On 17 March 2014, it was presented to the HRC in 
Geneva.  It there attracted a strong vote from the HRC members 
(30:6:9).  The COI found:  
Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations 
have been and are being committed by the [DPRK], its 
institutions and officials.  In many instances, the violations 
of human rights found by the commission constitute crimes 
against humanity.  These are not mere excesses of the State; 
they are essential components of a political system that has 
moved far from the ideals on which it claims to have been 
founded.  The gravity, scale and nature of these violations 
reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the 
contemporary world.  Political scientists of the 20th century 
characterized this type of political organization as a 
totalitarian State: a State that does not content itself with 
ensuring the authoritarian rule of a small group of people, 
but seeks to dominate every aspect of its citizens’ lives and 
terrorizes them from within.68 
The COI made the following specific findings: 
 
 “there is an almost complete denial of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to 
freedom of opinion, expression, information, and 
association.”69 
                                                     
66 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 1201–1202 (detailing the options).  The 
other options included (1) a peace and reconciliation process; (2) an ad hoc 
international tribunal; (3) a joint national and international ad hoc tribunal; and (4) 
appointment of a special prosecutor, without a designated court, to continue to 
gather and evaluate evidence. 
67 Id. para. 5.  
68 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211. 
69 Id. para. 259. 
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 The DPRK “operates an all-encompassing indoctrination 
machine” commencing at an early age “to propagate an 
official personality cult” and to ensure “absolute obedience to 
the Supreme Leader,” effectively extinguishing independent 
thought;70 
 There is strict control of all social activities. Pervasive 
surveillance geared at ensuring that “virtually no expression 
critical of the political system or of its leadership goes 
undetected. Citizens are punished for any “anti-State” 
activities . . .”71 
 Information is absolutely restricted to state sources and the 
“monopoly [is protected] by carrying out regular crackdowns 
and enforcing harsh punishments”;72 
 Religious persecution against Christians is pervasive. 
“Christians are prohibited from practising their religion and . 
. . [those] caught practising . . .  are subject to severe 
punishments in violation of the right to freedom of religion 
and the prohibition of religious discrimination.”73 
 Discrimination that is sponsored by the state “is pervasive . . 
. [and] rooted in the songbun system, which classifies people 
on the basis of State-assigned social class and birth,74 and also 
includes consideration of political opinions and religion. 
Songbun intersects with gender-based discrimination, which 
is equally pervasive. Discrimination is also practised on the 
basis of disability”; 
 Gender discrimination is egregious and takes many forms 
including targeting for bribery: “[there are] blatantly 
discriminatory restrictions on women in an attempt to 
maintain the gender stereotype of the pure and innocent 
                                                     
70 Id. para. 260. 
71 Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 28. 
72 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 263. 
73 Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 31.  
74 The COI noted that  
the songbun system used to be the most important factor in determining 
where individuals were allowed to live; what sort of accommodation they 
had; what occupations they were assigned to; whether they were 
effectively able to attend school, in particular university; how much food 
they received; and even whom they might marry.  
Id. para. 33. 
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Korean woman.  Sexual and gender-based violence against 
women is prevalent throughout all areas of society.”75 
 There is drastic violation of “all aspects of the right to freedom 
of movement [and] the State imposes on citizens where they 
must live and work, violating their freedom of choice.”76 
 Citizens are banned from leaving the country and having 
contact with foreigners.77 Those “found to have been in 
contact with officials or nationals from the Republic of Korea 
or with Christian churches may be forcibly “disappeared” 
into political prison camps, imprisoned in ordinary prisons or 
even summarily executed.”78 
 China is in violation of “its obligation to respect the principle 
of non-refoulement under international refugee and human 
rights law.” by repatriating those crossing the border back to 
DPRK.79 
                                                     
75 The COI recorded that “[d]iscrimination against women also intersects with 
a number of other human rights violations, placing women in positions of 
vulnerability.  Violations of the rights to food and freedom of movement have 
resulted in women and girls becoming vulnerable to trafficking and increased 
engagement in transactional sex and prostitution.”  In addition, “[w]omen 
abducted from Europe, the Middle East and Asia were subjected to forced 
marriages with men from other countries to prevent liaisons on their part with 
ethnic Korean women that could result in interracial children.  Some of the 
abducted women have also been subject to sexual exploitation.”  Id. paras. 36, 67. 
76 Id. paras. 38–39. 
77 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 1104 
(Border guards remain authorized to shoot to kill persons who cross the 
DPRK border without permission.  Such killings amount to murder.  They 
cannot be justified as legitimate border control measures, because they 
serve to uphold a de facto total travel ban on ordinary citizens that violates 
international law.  Furthermore, the intentional taking of life for purposes 
of preventing the unauthorized crossing of a border is grossly 
disproportionate.) 
78 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 489.  The COI also finds that “severe 
impediments put in place by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to prevent 
contact and communication with family members in the Republic of Korea are a 
breach of the State’s obligations under international human rights law. The 
restrictions are arbitrary, cruel and inhuman.” 
79 Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 43.  This practice adopted by China 
under the plea that these people are economic migrants has horrific effects on 
women and children. As the COI points out,  
Many women are trafficked by force or deception from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea into or within China for the purposes of 
exploitation in forced marriage or concubinage, or prostitution under 
coercive circumstances. An estimated 20,000 children born to women from 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are currently in China. These 
children are deprived of their rights to birth registration, nationality, 
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 The DPRK “has used food as a means of control over the 
population . . . it [confiscates] food from those in need . . . [and 
provides it] to other groups. The State has practised 
discrimination with regard to access to and distribution of 
food based on the songbun system.”80 
 There is “evidence of systematic, widespread and grave 
violations of the right to food81 . . . decisions, actions and 
omissions by the State and its leadership caused the death of 
at least hundreds of thousands of people and inflicted 
permanent physical and psychological injuries on those who 
survived.”82 The consequences were particularly grave for 
children.83 Crucially, the state was responsible for breaching 
                                                     
education and health care because their birth cannot be registered without 
exposing the mother to the risk of refoulement by China. 
Id. para. 44.  
80 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 683.  The COI made a finding that 
during periods of “mass starvation, the [DPRK] impeded the delivery of food aid 
by imposing conditions that were not based on humanitarian considerations. 
International humanitarian agencies were subject to restrictions contravening 
humanitarian principles.”  Id. para. 687.  In addition, “deliberate starvation [is used] 
as a means of control and punishment in detention facilities. This has resulted in 
the deaths of many political and ordinary prisoners.” Id. para. 689. 
81  Washington Public Hearing, 30 October 2013 (00:45:19); Detailed Findings, 
supra note 1 para. 516, 
When my younger brother was born . . . my grandmother actually wanted 
to kill [him] because my mom was very undernourished and she was not 
able to lactate. [My mother] begged my grandmother saying, ‘Please do 
not kill the baby.’ . . . I had to take care of this baby brother. So I was 
piggybacking him around the town and sometimes my grandmother had 
to carry him around to make him stop crying. But as I mentioned, because 
there was no food, he was not able to stop crying. . . [My] baby brother 
died in my arms because he was not able to eat. And because I was holding 
him so much, he thought I was his mom. So when I was feeding him water, 
he was sometimes looking at me smiling at me. 
82 Id.  
Commission finds that there was awareness about the famine situation all 
the way up to the Supreme Leader. Former officials stated that the 
provinces submitted detailed reports about the situation to the capital. 
Kim Jong-il also visited numerous locations in the country as part of his 
“military first” and “on-the-spot guidance” visits. On these occasions, he 
could not have missed what was happening in the country. 
83  Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 545.  
Between 2003 and 2008, 45 per cent of children under five in the DPRK 
were stunted. For the same age group, nine per cent were suffering from 
wasting and seven per cent were severely underweight. The most recent 
UNICEF-financed nutritional survey concluded that 27.9 per cent of the 
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international legal obligations in relation to the right to food.84 
The COI found that “deliberately providing misleading 
information to international humanitarian actors or 
preventing international food aid from reaching starving 
populations can constitute extermination, if mass deaths 
occur” and because the authorities knew that their decisions 
aggravated mass deaths, their “level of criminal intent is 
sufficient for the crime of extermination.”85 
 The regime is kept alive by “police and security forces . . . 
systematically employ[ing] violence and punishments that 
amount to gross human rights violations”;86 
 Specifically, political prisoners are arbitrary arrested and 
detained indefinitely by the State Security Department, the 
                                                     
country’s two year olds are afflicted by stunting and 8.4 per cent of all 
children in that age group are severely stunted.  
The COI also noted the dire impacts on women: “women in the DPRK, particularly 
mothers in the family, have experienced severe deterioration in their health, largely 
because they either skipped or reduced portions of their meals for the benefit of 
other family members.” Id. para 560. 
84 One of the obligations identified by the COI was Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, 
which states that  
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures. (emphasis supplied by the COI).  
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 637. The COI found that “the allocation of 
resources by the DPRK has grossly failed to prioritize the objective of freeing people 
from hunger and chronic malnutrition, in particular in times of mass starvation.” 
Id. para 639. Other obligations include a right to “Freedom from hunger” which 
“lies at the conjunction of the right to adequate food (article 11 (2) of the ICESCR) 
and the right to life (article 6 of the ICCPR).” Id. para 665. The COI found that 
“decisions, actions and omissions by the DPRK and its leadership have generated 
and aggravated this situation. They have caused at least hundreds of thousands of 
human beings to perish.” Id. para 674; That “the DPRK has been responsible for the 
deliberate starvation of people detained for interrogation purposes as well as those 
imprisoned in political prison camps and the ordinary prison system.” Id. para 681; 
and that “decisions, actions and omissions by the state and its leadership have 
caused the death of at the very least hundreds of thousands of human beings and 
inflicted permanent physical and psychological injury including intergenerational 
harm, on those who survived.” Id. para. 690. 
85 Id. paras. 1121-22. 
86 Id. para. 838.  
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Ministry of People’s Security and the Korean People’s Army 
Military Security Command;87 
 Torture is regularly employed in interrogations and 
“[s]tarvation and other inhumane conditions of detention are 
deliberately imposed on suspects to increase the pressure on 
them to confess and to incriminate other persons”;88 
 Those convicted of committing major political offenses are 
“disappeared” without trial or judicial order, to political 
prison camps (kwanliso).89 
 The forced disappearances are not confined to DPRK citizens: 
“over 200,000 persons, including children, who were brought 
from other countries to the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea may have become victims of enforced disappearance, 
as defined in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance.”90 
 The COI estimated that “hundreds of thousands of political 
prisoners have perished in these camps over the past five 
                                                     
87 The COI applied the legal framework provided by “article 6 (the right to 
life), article 7 (freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), 
article 9 (right to liberty and security of the person), article 10 (humane treatment 
of detainees), and article 14 (right to a fair trial) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).” The COI found that “Courts appear not to ever 
be involved in the decision to send a person to a political prison camp. This 
exclusion violates not only international law, but also article 127 of the DPRK Code 
of Criminal Procedure Code.” Id. At para 721. Further, “non-judicial prison 
“sentences” violate the suspect’s right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law, which is established by 
article 14 of the ICCPR.” Id. para 727. 
88 The COI report details Mr Jeong’s ‘pigeon torture’.  
[Y]our hands are handcuffed behind your back. And then they hang you 
so you would not be able to stand or sit . . . There are no people watching 
you.  There is nobody.  And you can’t stand, you can’t sleep.  If you are 
hung like that for three days, four days, you urinate, you defecate, you are 
totally dehydrated. . . . [the pigeon torture] was the most painful of all 
tortures . . . [it] was so painful that I felt it was better to die.  
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, morning (02:09:00); Detailed Findings, supra 
note 1, para. 715. 
89 Detailed Findings, para. 793.  
In the kwanliso, the inmates are no longer registered citizens, so you do 
not need a law to decide the sentences.  The bowibu [SSD] agent is the 
person who decides whether you are saved or you are executed.  There 
are no other criteria other than his words.  [The inmates] are already 
eliminated from society. 
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, afternoon (00:58:40). 
90 Detailed Findings, para. 1011. 
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decades.  The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed 
against inmates of the kwanliso political prison camps 
resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States 
established during the twentieth century.”91 
 The denials about the camps by the DPRK are contradicted by 
satellite imagery and it is “estimated that between 80,000 and 
120,000 political prisoners are currently detained in four large 
political prison camps”;92 
 Prisoners are executed “with or without trial;, publicly or 
secretly, in response to political and other crimes that are 
often not among the most serious crimes.”  The regime 
apparently employs public executions as a means to “instil 
fear in the general population,”93 and various state 
institutions were responsible.94 
                                                     
91 Id. para. 842.  The COI found that the atrocities were not limited to those 
convicted of major crimes:  
Prisoners in the ordinary prison system are systematically subjected to 
deliberate starvation and illegal forced labour.  Torture, rape and other 
arbitrary cruelties at the hands of guards and fellow prisoners are 
widespread and committed with impunity . . . Once you are in there, not 
a lot of people make it out.  Once you are in the solitary cell, you are beaten 
up and they give you 30 grams per meal and you get cold, so that leads to 
an immediate weakness.  Somebody who weighs 50 kilograms [when they 
go in], their weight is reduced to 20 kilograms [when they exit solitary 
confinement].  
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, morning (01:48:10). 
92 Id. para. 1062. 
93 Id. para. 845. The COI found that  
a large number of executions are carried out in places of detention in the 
DPRK. In some cases, the execution is based on a judicial sentence. In other 
cases, summary execution is imposed without any known trial or judicial 
order, apparently to uphold discipline and institutional rules. . . . Inmates 
of political and ordinary prison camps are particularly vulnerable to secret 
executions. . . . The killing of prisoners can also be easily concealed because 
the bodies of prison camp inmates are never returned to their family. The 
Commission received credible first-hand information about instances of 
secret summary executions carried out in prison camps and interrogation 
detention facilities. 
Id. paras 834-35. 
94  Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para 839.  
“Gross human rights violations . . . in respect of detention, execution and 
disappearances are characterized by a high degree of centralized 
coordination between different parts of the extensive security apparatus. 
The State Security Department, Ministry of People’s Security and the 
Korean People’s Army Military Security Command regularly subject 
persons accused of political crimes to arbitrary arrest. This falls short of 
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 Crucially, “operations [involving disappearances] were 
approved at the level of the Supreme Leader.”95  The 
disappearances appear to be motivated by the desire to “gain 
labour and other skills for the State.”  In some instances, there 
were to “further espionage and terrorist activities.”96  
 The COI found that “from 1950 until the present, the DPRK 
has engaged in the systematic abduction, denial of 
repatriation and subsequent enforced disappearance of 
persons from other countries on a large scale and as a matter 
of State policy. Well over 200,000 persons who were taken 
from other countries to the DPRK may have potentially 
become victims of enforced disappearance, as defined in the 
Declaration for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.”97 International abductions continue to 
present date and “[since] the 1990s, its agents have abducted 
a number of persons from Chinese territory, including 
                                                     
the legal requirements set out by international law and even under the 
[DPRK’s] own laws.”  
With regard to legal responsibility, the COI found that 
various decisions and policies of the DPRK leadership . . .  entail crimes of 
murder as defined in international criminal law, because the responsible 
officials aggravated starvation in full awareness that this would cause 
more deaths in the ordinary course of events. . . .  most of the public 
executions carried out in response to economic crimes for survival during 
the famine amounted to murder, as defined by international criminal law. 
Id. paras 1128-29. 
95 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, at para 835: “secret executions could be 
linked to a directive that was allegedly issued by Kim Jong-il in 1997 and instructed 
the security apparatus to eliminate all elements who are “diseased in mind”. 
Further, the COI 
has received information directly indicating that the camp system is 
controlled from the highest level of the state. In some cases, the 
Commission was able to trace orders to cause the disappearance of 
individuals to the camps to the level of the Supreme Leader. Moreover, 
the State Security Department, which decides whether to send individuals 
to the camp, is subject to the directions and close oversight of the Supreme 
Leader. 
Id. para 1065. 
96 Id. para. 853.  The COI noted that “family members abroad and foreign States 
wishing to exercise their right to provide diplomatic protection have been 
consistently denied information necessary to establish the fate and whereabouts of 
the victims.  Family members of the disappeared have been subjected to torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” Id. para. 1019.  
97 Id. para 1011. 
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nationals of China, the Republic of Korea and, in at least one 
case, a former Japanese national.”98 
 Of special import, the COI found that “the body of testimony 
and other information it received establishes that crimes 
against humanity have been committed in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established 
at the highest level of the State.”99 
 The COI also established that these crimes including 
“extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, 
imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual 
violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender 
grounds,” the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced 
disappearance of persons, and the inhumane act of 
knowingly causing prolonged starvation” are ongoing.100  
 
Specifically, the COI determined that “crimes against humanity 
have been committed against starving populations, particularly 
during the 1990s . . . from decisions and policies violating the right 
to food, which were applied for the purposes of sustaining the 
present political system, in full awareness that such decisions would 
exacerbate starvation and related deaths” of much of the 
population.101 
                                                     
98 Id. para. 1020.  The COI observed that “human rights violations continue 
against them and their families. The shock and pain caused by such actions is 
indescribable.” Id. para. 1021.  
99 Id. para. 1160. The COI found that “that DPRK authorities have committed 
and are committing crimes against humanity in the political prison camps, 
including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape and 
other grave sexual violence and persecution on political, religious and gender 
grounds.” Id. para 1033.  
Further, 
inmates of political prison camps are victims of the crime of 
imprisonment. Inmates are imprisoned, usually for life, in camps without 
ever having been brought before a judge in accordance with article 9 (3) 
and (4) of the ICCPR. . . . inmates of the DPRK’s political prison camps are 
victims of the crime of enforced disappearance. . . .  living conditions in 
the political prison camps are calculated to bring about mass deaths. . . . 
intentional killings of individual inmates in the DPRK’s political prison 
camps, through summary executions, beatings, infanticide, deliberate 
starvation and other illegal means, all amount to the crime of murder. . . . 
inmates in the DPRK’s political prison camps are generally victims of the 
crime of persecution. 
Id. paras. 1039, 1043, 1047, 1058. 
100 Id. paras. 1028-76. 
101 Id. para. 1162. 
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Having made these chilling findings, the COI issued a set of 
recommendations. Perhaps the most significant in terms of actual 
executability is a call for the UN to ensure “that those most 
responsible for the crimes against humanity committed . . . are held 
accountable.”102 The COI suggested that the UNSC could refer the 
situation to the International Criminal Court or the UN set up an ad 
hoc tribunal.103 The COI made a number of other recommendations 
that might be termed aspirational in terms of the prospect of 
actualisation in the near term.104 These included a demand to 
provide access to political prisoners and their immediate release, 
institute “political and institutional reforms . . . to introduce genuine 
checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader and 
the Workers’ Party of Korea,” creation of an independent and 
impartial judiciary, a “multiparty political system and elected 
people’s assemblies at the local and central levels that emerge from 
genuinely free and fair elections,” establishment of an “independent 
constitutional and institutional reform commission,” and 
“acknowledge[ment of] the existence of human rights violations, 
including the political prison camps.”105 Legal reforms such as 
abolishment of “vaguely worded ‘anti-State’ and ‘anti-People’ 
                                                     
102 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1218. (The COI also made the 
following sobering call for responsibility:  
The international community must accept its responsibility to protect the 
people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against 
humanity, because the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea has manifestly failed to do so. In particular, this responsibility 
must be accepted in the light of the role played by the international 
community (and by the great powers in particular) in the division of the 
Korean peninsula and because of the unresolved legacy of the Korean 
War.) 
103 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1219 (The COI also recommended that 
this be combined with a “reinforced human rights dialogue, the promotion of 
incremental change through more people-to-people contact and an inter-Korean 
agenda for reconciliation.”) 
104 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211-25. (In this category was a 
recommendation to  
Prosecute and bring to justice those persons most responsible for alleged 
crimes against humanity; appoint a special prosecutor to supervise this 
process; ensure that victims and their families are provided with adequate, 
prompt and effective reparation and remedies, including by knowing the 
truth about the violations that have been suffered; launch a people-driven 
process to establish the truth about the violations; provide adults and 
children with comprehensive education on national and international law 
and practice on human rights and democratic governance.)  
105 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1220. 
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crimes” in the criminal code, the creation of a guarantee of the “right 
to a fair trial and due process . . . articulated in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” enforcement of the 
prohibitions and criminalization of “torture and other inhuman 
means of interrogation that are illegal under international law,” and 
the guarantee of “humane conditions of detention for all inmates 
deprived of liberty” within the prison system were also 
recommended.106 On the social front, the COI recommended that the 
DPRK adopt a “moratorium on the imposition and execution of the 
death penalty, followed without undue delay by the abolition of the 
death penalty,” create the conditions for the operation of a free 
press, access to “the Internet, social media, international 
communications, foreign broadcasts and publications, including the 
popular culture of other countries,” commence “education to ensure 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,” terminate 
“propaganda or educational activities that espouse national, racial 
or political hatred,” and “[e]nd discrimination against citizens on 
the basis of their perceived political loyalty or the sociopolitical 
background of their families.”107 It also called on the state to “[a]llow 
Christians and other religious believers to exercise their religion 
independently and publicly, without fear of punishment, reprisal or 
surveillance.”108 In response to the egregious violations of gender 
equality, the COI recommended that the DPRK undertake a series 
of practical measures.109 The COI also addressed recommendations 
to China. Specifically, it asked that China “[r]espect the principle of 
non-refoulement and . . . abstain from forcibly repatriating any 
persons to [DPRK] . . . extend asylum and other means of durable 
protection to persons fleeing the [DPRK] who need international 
protection.”110 Crucially, the COI asked China to “[t]ake immediate 
measures to prevent agents of [DPRK] from carrying out further 
abductions from Chinese territory; prosecute and adequately 
punish apprehended perpetrators of abduction and demand the 
                                                     
106 Id.   
107 Id.     
108 Id.    
109 Id. (explaining that these recommendations included “providing equal 
access for women in public life and employment; eradicate discriminatory laws, 
regulations and practices affecting women; take measures to address all forms of 
violence against women, including domestic violence, sexual and gender-based 
violence by State agents and/or within State institutions.”)  
110 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1220. 
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extradition of those giving such orders so that they may be tried in 
accordance with law.”111 
The COI called on the UN, specifically the SC, to “refer the 
situation in [DPRK] to the International Criminal Court for action in 
accordance with that court’s jurisdiction.”112 It asked the SC to 
“adopt targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most 
responsible for crimes against humanity.”113 
 
2.6. Aftermath of the COI Report 
 
The COI report was transmitted by the HRC to the UN General 
Assembly (“GA”). A resolution, sponsored by the EU and Japan, 
called for action on the report and GA referral to the Security 
Council.  A procedural resolution by Cuba to delete references to 
any such action, in the light of suggested new levels of cooperation 
from DPRK, was defeated (40:77:50). Subsequently, the Third 
Committee of the GA endorsed the EU-Japan resolution 
(111:19:55).114 The plenary GA adopted the resolution (116:20:55). 
Following this, France, joined by the United States and Australia 
co-sponsors, initiated the Arria arrangement in the Security Council 
on April 17, 2014.  It provided the facility of a briefing to members 
of the Security Council, as well as a concurrent briefing on the 
preceding day to members of the General Assembly.  This procedure 
                                                     
111 Id.    
112 Id.    
113 Id. (Stating  
In the light of the dire social and economic situation of the general 
population, the commission does not support sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council or introduced bilaterally that are targeted against the 
population or the economy as a whole.”).  The COI was acutely conscious 
of the pernicious side effects of sanctions on innocent people in a country 
beset by starvation: “States should not use the provision of food and other 
essential humanitarian assistance to impose economic or political pressure 
on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Humanitarian assistance 
should be provided in accordance with humanitarian and human rights 
principles, including the principle of non-discrimination. Aid should only 
be curbed to the extent that unimpeded international humanitarian access 
and related monitoring is not adequately guaranteed.  
Id. at 21. 
114 Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 25/25, UN GAOR, 3rd 
Comm’n, 69th Sess, 46th Mtg, Agenda Item 68 (c), Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/69/53, 
2 (Mar. 28, 2014) (endorsing the EU-Japan resolution).  
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indicates both the increasing concern of the international 
community about gross violations of human rights in North Korea 
and the need for a response to the high media coverage of the COI 
report.  All members of the Security Council save China and the 
Russian Federation attended.  Of the thirteen Security Council 
member states present at the Arria briefing, eleven intervened to 
address the issues.  None of them spoke adversely about the report 
or its conclusions or recommendations.  Of the eleven that spoke, 
nine expressed themselves in favor of a key recommendation 
included in the COI report and addressed specifically to the Security 
Council. This was the recommendation that the Security Council 
should “refer the situation in the [DPRK] to the International 
Criminal Court for action in accordance with that Court’s 
jurisdiction.”  
Neither in the Arria briefing of the Security Council members 
nor earlier in the HRC was there any criticism of particular findings 
or conclusions of the COI.  No factual finding was contested, other 
than by the generic denunciation of the COI by the representative of 
DPRK after the COI report was presented to the Council.  
Following the conclusion of the Arria briefing and the many 
strong statements calling for action, both on the part of members of 
the Security Council and on the part of other members of the United 
Nations present as observers, a “non-paper” dated July 11, 2014 was 
addressed by the permanent representatives of Australia, France, 
and the United States to the President of the Security Council.115  
This letter reported on the co-hosting of the meeting of Security 
Council members under the Arria formula on April 17, 2014 “to 
discuss the [COI] report.”116  The document concludes with a 
statement that the Security Council members had congratulated the 
COI for the “compelling report of exceptional quality” and had 
                                                     
115 Letter from the Permanent Reps. of Australia, France and the U.S. to the 
United Nations to the President of the Security Council (July 11, 2014).  Recording 
the co-convenors’ summary of the comments made by participants during the Arria 
meetings, the document insists that it “does not prejudge endorsement of their 
content by Australia, France, the United States or any other Member State;” but that 
it is provided “for further consideration.” Id. at 2. 
116 Id. at 1. 
We believe that the Security Council should formally discuss the 
commission’s findings of widespread and systematic human rights 
violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its 
recommendations to the Council, and consider appropriate action.  In 
particular, the Council should consider how those responsible for such 
violations should be held accountable. 
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“commended the courage of the two witnesses.”117  Council 
members “expressed grave concern at the horrific human rights 
violations and crimes against humanity outlined in the report”.118  
Most members of the Council “urged [DPRK] to comply with the 
Commission’s recommendations and to engage with the [UN] 
human rights system, including at its forthcoming universal 
periodic review”.119  As recorded in the “non-paper,” it was noted 
that “[s]everal non-Council members also voiced support for the 
aforementioned accountability efforts”.120 
In early December 2014, upon the request of three members of 
the Security Council (Australia, France and the United States of 
America), the Security Council President convened a meeting of the 
Security Council in response to the COI report.  Prior notice of a 
procedural motion placing issues of human rights in DPRK on the 
agenda of the Security Council was given by ten Security Council 
members.  This indicated the existence already of a two-thirds 
majority, as required by art. 27.2 of the UN Charter for decision of 
the Security Council on a procedural matter.  On 22 December 2014, 
the Security Council decided to place the issues of human rights in 
DPRK on its agenda for ongoing attention.  This decision was 
adopted by a strong vote (11:2:2).121  On a show of hands, the only 
votes against the procedural resolution were those of China and the 
Russian Federation. 
Following the COI’s public hearings, publicity and subsequent 
report, DPRK, for the first time, engaged to some degree with the 
UN human rights system.  It participated in the UPR of its human 
rights record; it produced its own—albeit  unpersuasive and 
                                                     
117 Id. at 4. (Listing among the key findings of the COI in the non-paper are 
references to: 1. the estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people imprisoned without trial in 
four large prison camps in the DPRK and others languishing in other prisons and 
interrogation centres where torture is a standard practice; 2. the forced repatriation 
of women who have tried to flee DPRK and their subjection to sexual humiliation 
and violence, as found by the COI; 3. the attempt of authorities in DPRK to control 
the minds of the population by indoctrination and violent suppressions of freedom 
of thought or opinion; and 4. the instances of cases of abduction and forced 
disappearance of well over 200,000 persons from China, Japan, ROK and other 
counties.)  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 U.N. S.C. 7353d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7353, (Dec. 22, 2014) (detailing 
speeches given by members of the Council on the situation in DPRK). 
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propagandistic—human rights report;122 and it promised dialogue 
with the EU, the Special Rapporteur, and others on human rights 
matters, which was subsequently withdrawn.123 
The report of the COI on DPRK “reveals the unique and 
dangerous conditions prevailing in the DPRK that do not have any 
parallel in the contemporary world.”124  The question now 
confronting the global community and the United Nations as its 
representative body is whether sufficient resolution and principle 
can be found to take the steps that are necessary to protect universal 
human rights in DPRK and to render accountable, quickly and 
effectively, those who have breached, and continue to breach, those 
rights.  The report of the COI on DPRK has been prepared in the 
hope and conviction that the answer to those questions is in the 
affirmative.  
 
3. RECALCITRANT STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
3.1. Is The Outlaw/Rogue Label Analytically Useful? 
 
The term “outlaw state” or “rogue state” has gained currency in 
modern reportage about international relations. 125  This is largely 
                                                     
122 Report of the DPRK Centre for Human Rights Studies, KOREA CENTRAL NEWS 
AGENCY, Sept. 13, 2014, available at http://www.ncnk.org/Report_of_the_DPRK_ 
Association_for_Human_Rights_Studies.pdf (documenting the current state of 
human rights in DPRK). Note that this source was originally published on the 
Korean Central News Agency website (www.kcna.kp), although no permanent url 
exists for the report on that site. 
123 North Korea says it has invited European Union human rights official to visit, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST Oct. 31, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/ 
article/1628934/north-korea-says-it-has-invited-european-union-human-rights-
official-visit (noting that the DPKR invited the EU’s top human rights official to 
visit and threatening to rescind invitations to visit previously issued to UN officials 
unless references to the International Criminal Court were dropped from the UN 
resolution on the country). 
124 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211.   
125 See MIROSLAV NINCIC, RENEGADE REGIMES: CONFRONTING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
IN WORLD POLITICS 18 (2007) (observing that “renegade regimes are deviant 
members of the international community, norm breaking is their key defining 
feature . . . ”).  See also IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 563, 566 
(2005) 
there are now two categories of outlaw states: ‘behavioural outlaws’, who 
violate norms, and ‘ontological outlaws’, who are outlaws ‘more for who 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5
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owed to the employment of the terms by the United States in its 
post-Cold War foreign policy.126  After recounting its early origins, 
Litwak elaborates that the modern concept of rogue state developed 
under Reagan.  The focus was on labeling states as outlaws if they 
supported terrorism aimed at the United States. Following the 
conclusion of the Cold War, the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction (“WMD”) by states inimical to the United States caused 
those states to be labelled as rogue states.127  Therefore, for Litwak, 
the label has everything to do with preservation of American 
preferences in international relations.128  On the other hand, John 
Rawls uses the term in a normative sense in his work Law of Peoples.  
He notes, “[t]he liberal and decent peoples' acceptance of the law of 
peoples is not sufficient—the society of peoples need to develop new 
institutions and practices to constrain outlaw states when they 
appear . . . among these practices should be the promotion of human 
rights.”129 
It must be recognized that despite the term’s currency and 
popular appeal, a state does not become an outlaw or a rogue 
following any formal legal procedure that is derived from treaties or 
other international law commitments.  This is in sharp distinction 
with domestic law outlaws—which is supposedly the basis for the 
analogical extension of the term into international relations.  In the 
former, an individual is assessed typically through a formal legal 
proceeding to have violated precise legal obligations and found to 
be guilty.  In the latter, the reality of international relations belies the 
                                                     
they are than what they have done’. In its recent deployments, democracy 
has been used to foster the category of ‘ontological outlaws’, those found 
deficient for what they are rather than for what they have done. 
126 See ROBERT S. LITWAK, ROGUE STATES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
CONTAINMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR 56 –57 (2000) (describing the emergence of the 
term “rogue status” at the end of the Cold War).  
127 Id. at 52 –54 (describing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as 
“the second key criterion” for labelling a state as “rouge” or “outlaw.”). 
128 Id. at 47-8 (discussing the United States’ use of the rogue state policy to 
promote American interests and giving examples of the political motivation behind 
the act of labelling of specific states as “rogue”). 
129 JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES 48 (1999).  See also id. at 90 
There are two kinds of non-ideal theory. One kind deals with conditions 
of non-compliance in which certain regimes refuse to comply with a 
reasonable Law of Peoples; these regimes think that a sufficient reason to 
engage in war is that it advances the regime's rational (not reasonable) 
interests. These regimes I call outlaw states.  
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existence of such orderly proceedings that are binding and capable 
of assessing the guilt of states.  
Therefore, the term “rogue” or “outlaw” as it is applied to states 
in international law is not a coherent concept.  It is politicised, 
idiosyncratic, and not accurately descriptive in a legal sense.  
However, that is not to deny its utility. 
 
3.2. The Objectives of Labelling 
 
Regardless of whether one chooses to employ the term “rogue,” 
“deviant,” or “outlaw” in reference to a problematic state, it is 
inescapable that the labels all proceed from a precondition—that the 
state has violated a set of norms shared by states within that norm-
community.  Due to the enormous variations between nation states 
along social, religious, political, and economic lines, it is worth 
asking whether there is a degree of shared normative commitment 
that justifies the imposition of labels like rogue, deviant, and outlaw.  
Analysis suggests that despite the above variations, modern states 
share religious,130 ethnic, gender,131 economic, linguistic, and 
technological bonds that give rise to common commitments 
embodied in international norms.132  For instance, most nation states 
                                                     
130 See Jeff Hynes, Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics, 22 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 143, 143—58 (2001) (examining the tie between 
transnational religious actors and state sovereignty). 
131 The women’s movement transcends national boundaries in its campaigns 
for issues affecting women around the world. The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women is one manifestation of 
a legal framework for this community. See generally G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (establishing an international treaty aimed at 
eliminating discrimination against women ); VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM, 
GLOBALIZING WOMEN (2005) (examining how the positive and negative aspects of 
globalization have helped to create transnational networks of feminist activists and 
organizations with shared agendas); TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
GLOBAL POLITICS (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997) (examining transnational social 
movements from the lens of actors traditionally excluded from the study of global 
politics); GLOBAL FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, ORGANIZING, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Myra M. Ferree & Aili M. Tripp eds., 2006) (exploring the social 
and political developments that have led the movement for women’s recognition 
as full persons).  
132 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining an epistemic community as a 
“network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area”). 
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have made a legal commitment to the condemnation of torture,133 
slavery,134 piracy,135 genocide,136 prostitution,137 and narcotic 
drugs.138  This is evidenced by their participation in the drafting and 
ratification of international law instruments on these subjects and 
both subsequent statements and conduct, which, although not 
exemplars of perfect compliance, exert substantial constraints on 
contraventions.  In addition to legal texts on these topics, there is a 
community of shared overarching norms constituted by the 
adoption of obligations associated with the membership of 
international organisations such as the United Nations.139 
                                                     
133 See generally U.N. Convention against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (placing an absolute prohibition on torture and imposing 
obligations on parties to prevent it from occurring).   
134 See generally Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (defining “slavery” and “slave trade”); Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7 1956 (advancing the goals of the 1926 
Convention); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.  
Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (setting forth the basic human right to liberty). 
135 See generally Convention on the High Seas art. 100, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (stating “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible 
extent in the repression of piracy . . . ”). 
136 See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (noting that “genocide, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime . . . ”).  
137 See generally Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, G.A. Res. 317(IV), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/4/317 (Dec. 2, 1949) (requiring punishment for those who promote human 
trafficking).  
138 See generally U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988) 
(establishing international drug trafficking offenses); Protocol amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3444 (Dec. 9, 1975) (inviting 
governments and the Secretary-General to support the International Narcotics 
Control Board); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Aug. 16, 1976, 1019 
U.N.T.S. 175 (establishing an international control system for psychotropic 
substances); Convention on the Suppression of the Trade in and use of Prepared 
Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337 (regulating the trading and international uses 
of opium); International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S 319; 
Convention on Raw Opium and Other Narcotics, Jan. 23, 1925 (introducing a 
regulatory system to be controlled by an Opium Board); andHague International 
Convention on Opium, Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187 (allowing states to use powers 
to regulate the opium trade). 
139 See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the 
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. at 529 (1998) (arguing that the 
Charter of the United Nations represents the constitution of the international 
community). 
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The international community with shared norms seeks 
objectives that are analogous to those sought to be achieved by 
national communities in their reaction to norm violators.  In the 
domestic context this is most powerfully illustrated by the 
deployment of criminal law to achieve “deterrence, incapacitation, 
just punishment, and rehabilitation.”140  The first can be divided up 
into general deterrence and specific deterrence.  General deterrence 
is aimed at establishing a calculus whereby any potential offender 
has to trade off the benefits from committing a crime against its 
expected costs, which are established at high levels in order to 
ensure that the costs outweigh the benefits.141  General deterrence is 
aimed at the whole community, not just prospective or actual 
offenders.  Studies about the effectiveness of deterrence in the 
domestic context show that in the absence of the threat of any 
punishment for criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would 
readily dissipate because crime would escalate and overwhelmingly 
frustrate the capacity of people to lead fulfilled lives.  Thus, general 
deterrence works in the sense that there is a connection between the 
existence of some form of criminal punishment and criminal 
conduct.  In contrast, specific deterrence aims to discourage crime 
by punishing individual offenders for their transgressions and, 
thereby, convincing them that crime does not pay.142  This is 
achieved by seeking to deter offenders from reoffending by 
inflicting imprisonment or other punishment that is costly, with the 
                                                     
140 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 2 
(2013). 
141 See generally Dieter Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of Meta-
Analysis of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y RES. 201 (2009) (studying the effect of 
general deterrence on different crimes); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime 
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 163, 177-78 (2004) (linking reduction in crime to the increased threat of 
punishment); Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà 
Vu All Over Again? 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 328 (2005) (examining the 
deterrent value of capital punishment); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH 
OF THE INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 90 (2014) (examining the literature on the premise that harsher 
punishments have significant deterrent effects.). 
141 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF THE INCARCERATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 68 (2014) (discussing the 
theory of general deterrence). 
142 See generally Daniel S Nagin, Francis T. Cullen and Cheryl L. Jonson, 
Imprisonment & Re-offending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115 (2008) (examining the effects of 
specific deterrence on prison rates). 
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goal of persuading them to avoid the unpleasant experience in the 
future.143  
Rehabilitation is aimed at reforming the offender.  The 
underlying premise is a recognition that offending behaviour is 
generated from a complex mix of social, economic, and familial 
factors and that offenders can be persuaded to reform their ways 
and become law-abiding citizens.  Under this model, harsh 
punishments and lengthy prison terms are ill-suited to persuasion 
and reformation.  In contrast, incapacitation seeks to remove the 
offender from society and prevent him from committing other 
offences during the time of punishment.  In addition to the 
traditional deprivation of liberty through imprisonment, less crude 
forms of incapacitation include the termination of professional 
licenses, bans, and other forms of immobilisation of the offender 
from situations where he is likely to offend.  Needless to say, 
incapacitation is only effective if the offender would have re-
offended during the term of the prison sentence.  Further, 
incapacitation is a blunt tool; it does not pay to imprison offenders 
in order to prevent them from committing minor or trivial offenses 
when the cost of imprisonment exceeds the damage caused by their 
crimes.  There are no established models for determining with a high 
degree of accuracy offenders who will re-offend.  In addition, 
research has demonstrated that incarceration might have 
‘criminogenic’ effects.144  Lower level offenders interact with more 
serious criminals in prison and tend to commit more serious crimes 
upon release.  To be sure, there are complex reasons for this 
phenomenon, including socialization into a criminal culture, 
diminishment of lawful employment opportunities upon 
conviction, deterioration of relationships, and negative mental well-
being.145 
                                                     
143 See generally Mirko Bagaric &Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal 
Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, 
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L. J. 159 (2012) 
(studying empirical data on whether specific deterrence achieves sentencing goals). 
144 See Lynne M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: 
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 589, 593 (2007) 
(defining the “criminogenic” effect as the “direct and positive impact [of prison 
release] on crime if prisoners commit more crimes than they would have had they 
not gone to prison.”). 
145 See Christy Visher, Jennifer Yahner, and Nancy G. La Vigne, Urban Inst., 
Life After Prison: Tracking the Experiences of Male Prisoners Returning to Chicago, 
Cleveland, and Houston, URBAN INSTITUTE (May 27, 2010), available at 
http://urbn.is/1ySLXk4 (finding many men after prison “struggled with extensive 
criminal and substance use histories, and significant shares returned to crime (17 
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Finally, the community seeks to achieve the goal of retribution 
in meting out punishment for norm violations.  In its most primitive 
form, retribution is based on the idea of the lex talionis—an eye for 
an eye.  The goal is to exact vengeance on the offender in proportion 
to the harm he has caused to the victim. 
Applying the above to international law, it is clear that 
incapacitation is an expensive option, as it requires the use of 
military force.  Specific and general deterrence may also call for 
military force in order to be effective, except to the extent that similar 
results could be achieved at lower cost through the employment of 
other options such as economic sanctions and shaming.  In this 
context, the employment of labels like outlaw, rogue, and deviant 
might be aimed at achieving the objectives of deterrence by shaming 
the state alleged to have violated international norms.  Similarly, the 
international community might attempt rehabilitation by educating 
and persuading the violator to change its behavior after shaming. 
Shaming is “the process by which citizens publicly and self-
consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an 
offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or 
engaging in those actions.”146  In the criminal law context, shaming 
can take the form of publication of the identities of patrons of 
prostitutes in the media,147 to mandating specifically negative 
license plates for those convicted of driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs.148  In some instances, courts have used shaming as 
part of the sentencing process.149  Critically, deterrence is key to 
                                                     
percent, self-reported), substance use (27 percent), and prison (22 percent, official) 
within 7 to 12 months of release.”). 
146 Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals—A Proposal 
for Reform to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 U. Chi. J.L. & Econ., 365, 368 (1999) 
(looking at shaming in the context of white-collar criminals). 
147 See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV., 733, 735 (1998) (suggesting how shaming offers an alternative to traditional 
forms of punishment); see also Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The 
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and 
Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (1996) (discussing the non-
financial policy implications of shaming prostitute’s patrons). 
148 See Donna DiGiovanni, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 22 
NEW ENG. L. REV., 643, 644 (1988) (referencing the trial court’s decision in 
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).  
149 Shaming has been employed in U.S. courts various times. See United States 
v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring a convict to wear a 
signboard proclaiming his guilt); United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 
1998) (requiring the defendant to publish notice in the official journal of the parish); 
United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring the defendant 
to notify all future employers of the defendant’s past tax offenses); People v. 
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shaming because the objective is to show other members of the 
community that offending can be costly.150  Shaming might also 
serve retributive goals, as it provides an outlet for the expression of 
the community’s disapproval at the offender’s act and allows 
disparate actors to punish the offender by attacking his 
reputation.151  This can have significant negative effects for the 
offender even when he is able to counteract institutional forms of 
punishment.   
 
 
                                                     
Letterlough, 205 A.D.2d 803, 804, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (requiring 
the defendant to place a “CONVICTED DWI” sign on his license plate); People v. 
McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812–13, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. App. 1976) (requiring 
the defendant who was a purse thief who used tennis shoes to approach his victims 
quietly and flee swiftly to wear tap shoes); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123, 124 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring a defendant to place a sticker: “CONVICTED 
D.U.I.—RESTRICTED LICENSE” on their car); Ballenger v. Georgia, 436 S.E.2d 793, 
794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (imposing a condition requiring the offender to wear a 
fluorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT”). See 
contra People v. Hackler, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 686 –87 (1993), (requiring a shoplifting 
offender to wear a t-shirt whenever he left the house reading, “My record plus two 
six-packs equals four years” on the front and “I am on felony probation for theft” 
on the back. This was struck down in appeal on the ground that the objective was 
to “public[ly] ridicule and humiliate[e]” and not “to foster rehabilitation.” Id. at 686 
–87); People v. Johnson, 174 Ill. App.3d 812, 124 Ill. Dec. 252, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (1988), 
(requiring a DWI offender to publish a newspaper advertisement with apology and 
mug shot. This was struck down because it “possibly, add[ed] public ridicule as a 
condition” and was contrary to the goal of rehabilitation. Id. at 1362). 
150 See U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (2004), supra note 131, at 599 (imposing a 
sentence that included performing community service while wearing a signboard 
stating that he stole mail on a defendant convicted of mail theft in order to better 
comport with the court’s aim of deterrence); see also E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 
1120–21 (1997) 
. . . notification results in shaming the offender, thereby effecting some 
amount of retribution. This suffering ‘serves as a threat of negative 
repercussions [thereby] discourag[ing] people from engaging in certain 
behavior.’ It is, therefore, also a deterrent. There is no disputing this 
deterrent signal; the notification provisions are triggered by behavior that 
is already a crime, suggesting that those who consider engaging in such 
behavior should beware. 
151 See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 609, 612 (2006) (noting that “shaming punishments replace a concrete physical 
harm with a largely symbolic or expressive one . . . ”); see also Dan Kahan, What’s 
Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2075, 2087 (2006) (suggesting 
that shaming will not be effective because egalitarian citizens will not embrace it as 
an alternative means of punishment). 
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3.3. Objections to Shaming  
 
To be sure, shaming might have negative consequences.152  As in 
the case of traditional punishments, offenders might form sub-
groups where norm-breaking is tolerated (or even celebrated).153  
The goal of these sub-groups might be to offer support—such as 
financial or legal support—for the offender and provide protection 
from negative consequences.154  Gangs and terrorist organizations 
are examples of such sub-communities.155  Aside from these issues, 
shaming risks idiosyncratic enforcement depending upon factors 
unrelated to the quality of the offence.  For instance, India and 
Pakistan were treated more charitably than North Korea after 
testing nuclear weapons, although all three states acted in 
contravention of international law norms.156  The strategic 
importance of these states to the United States might have 
influenced its support for minimal punishment for possessing 
nuclear weapons, in contrast to states such as North Korea and Iran, 
which have been dealt with more harshly.157  However, it must be 
acknowledged that inequality and disproportionality are problems 
                                                     
152 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 748 (1998) (stating that “shame punishments may be disproportionately too 
weak or . . . too strong”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, 
SHAME, AND THE LAW 15 (2004) (arguing that a type of shame called “primitive 
shame” is “a way of hiding from our humanity that is irrational . . . bound up with 
narcissism”); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 645, 648 (1997) (explaining that shaming can create a desire for retaliation); Toni 
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884 
(1991) (stating that “the limiting concerns of proportionality, equality, and cruelty . 
. . point against use of [shaming] penalties.”).  
153 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (stating that 
“[offenders] associate with others who are perceived in some limited or total way 
as also at odds with mainstream standards.”). 
154 See Kahan, supra note 133, at 2095 (concluding that shame creates an 
“inescapable expressive partisanship.”). 
155 David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1817-18 
(2001); BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135. 
156 See Uttara Choudhury, Seven years after going nuclear, India and Pakistan 
thriving, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (June 2, 2005), http://www.spacewar.com/ 
2005/050602015347.lmtxze92.html. (“Based on the experiences of India and 
Pakistan since they tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea could be forgiven 
for thinking the price of carrying out an atomic test is worth paying.”). 
157 Bill Nicholas, Condemnation Swift, but Options are Limited, USA TODAY (Oct. 
9 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/college/polisci/articles/ 
20061015.htm (citing Ted Galen Carpenter’s explanation that North Korea’s 
rationale for testing nuclear weapons is to gain bargaining power like Pakistan).  
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that bedevil even traditional sanctions and therefore are not fatal 
objections to shaming.  
Another objection to shaming is that the tactic entails costs just 
like other types of punishments.158  It is costly for an individual to 
build and maintain a reputation, and the wasting of these 
expenditures may not always outweigh benefits obtained by 
adversely impacting that reputation.159  Further, imposing the 
shaming punishment also entails a cost—the community has to 
undertake activities that go beyond mere cheap talk in order to 
effectively shame the offender.160  For example, a state that wishes 
to subject another state to shaming might have to end commercial 
relationships between its business entities and those in the shamed 
state with the result that its citizens experience an increase in prices 
for commodities and consumer goods.  It would also have to expend 
resources on policing rogue companies that choose to defy its 
instructions, etc.161 
Critics also argue that modern society does not offer conducive 
conditions for shaming because of the lack of social 
interdependence;162 social heterogeneity creates problems of 
definition pertaining to the kinds of offences that might engender a 
feeling of shame.163   However, this objection has little salience 
because nation states are extremely interdependent. These 
relationships of interdependence mean that shaming can result in 
lost developmental aid and grants,164 termination of foreign direct 
investment,165 the efflux of foreign institutional investors from stock 
markets inflicting losses on investors,166 the collapse of a state’s 
                                                     
158 Kahan & Posner, supra note 140, at 372. 
159 Skeel, supra note 137, at 1818–19. 
160 Id. at 1819. 
161 Id. 
162 Massaro, supra note 141, at 1917 (noting that shaming is ineffective in part 
due to cities’ in the United States lack of interdependence and cohesiveness). 
163 Id. at 1923. (“Thus, even if a particular community could theoretically 
impose shame on an offender, a given judge’s particular method of accomplishing 
that goal may still be off the mark.”). 
164 Rich Nielsen, Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against 
Repressive States, 57 INT’L STUD. Q. 791, 791 (2012) (finding that aid donors withdraw 
aid when repressive acts are publicized in the media). 
165 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade 
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 595 (2005). 
166 Not Open for Business: Despite Elections, Investor Risk Remains High in Burma, 
CONFLICT RISK NETWORK, (Apr. 2012), http://endgenocide.org/images/uploads/ 
downloads/burma-not-open-for-business.pdf. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
  
276 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:1 
currency,167 the embargoing of contracts with companies based in 
the offending state,168 restrictions on the repatriation of capital to 
that state,169 restrictions on travel to and from that state,170 and the 
suspension and expulsion of that state from multilateral 
organizations.171  
A powerful critique of shaming is about the lack of authority and 
legitimacy.  Shaming punishments are typically imposed by a variety 
of actors which might include NGOs, international organiazations, 
media agencies, and private actors.  As is apparent, NGOs, media 
agencies, and private actors do not possess authority in any formal 
legal sense.  In other words, the offending state is not subject to these 
organizations under any legal instrument.  Moreover, the primary 
addressees of international law are sovereign states which are only 
bound by consent.  Therefore, the argument is that these NGOs and 
private actors do not possess any authority to impose punishment 
on sovereign states.  The second criticism pertains to the lack of 
legitimacy.  This is related to the idea that shaming is imposed 
without the preconditions of legitimacy antecedent to the 
imposition of traditional punishments in domestic law.  These 
pertain to the existence of legal rules that result from democratic 
participation in law-making, identified institutions charged with 
formal legal authority for enforcement, formal processes for 
establishment of rule violations and procedural safeguards to 
                                                     
167 Iran Arrests 50 Over Currency Decline, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://news.yahoo.com/iran-arrests-50-over-currency-decline-122538312--
finance.html. 
168 Judge Blocks Fla. Cuba, Syria Business Ties Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 
2012), http://cnsnews.com/print/news/article/judge-blocks-fla-cuba-syria-
business-ties-law. 
169 U.S. Government Eases Sanctions Against Burma, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (July 12, 
2012), http://www.sidley.com/en/news/us-government-eases-sanctions-
against-burma-07-12-2012; Council Decision 2012/365/CFSP, amending Decision 
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 2012 O.J. (L 282) 58–
69. 
170 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Human rights violations: 
Council tightens sanctions against Iran (Mar. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/    
foraff/129215.pdf.  
171 The Positive and Punitive Power of CMAG, COMMONWEALTH QUARTERLY, 
(2008), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/EZInformation/176155/ 
060308cmag/. Organization of Islamic Cooperation Suspends Syria’s Membership, AL 
ARABIYA NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/ 
13/232088.html. 
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protect the rights of offenders, and certain fundamental rights that 
constrain both the power to make rules and enforce them. 
The first element of legitimacy—legal rules enacted pursuant to 
a formal institutional process typically subject to democratic 
participation—is somewhat easy to overcome in situations 
involving codified legal rules where a state has ratified a treaty or 
convention embodying those rules.  The assumption is that 
legitimacy is conferred by the state’s participation in lawmaking, 
secondary participation by its domestic institutional actors, and 
tertiary involvement by lay citizens.  Such legitimacy is presumed 
even if a particular state does not possess mandatory constitutional 
requirements for the international rules to be debated in domestic 
parliaments or for its citizens to participate in any meaningful sense.  
The very fact of the ratification of the international law instrument 
adopted pursuant to a formal legal process by an organization with 
subject-matter authority confers the rule with legitimacy, at least in 
the formal legal sense.  This is analogous to the making of domestic 
legal rules.  However, there are several complications.  First, 
customary international law rules, particularly those derived from 
colonial times, raise questions about legitimacy because of the 
absence of participation from erstwhile colonies.  Second, modern 
codified rules are created by institutions with the active 
participation of states with gross actual violations of the rules being 
proposed, raising questions about whether the rules are really 
meant to be binding in any meaningful sense.172  Third, although 
most states participate in the drafting and adopting process, the 
reality is that the rules are a reflection of the interests of dominant 
powers.  Weaker states are often mute spectators in the lawmaking 
process because their representatives are at a disadvantage due to of 
deficits in technical capacity, resources, and lobbying capabilities. 
The second element—institutions for enforcement—is again 
satisfied where a treaty regime creates a machinery for monitoring 
and policing state commitments.  It is of course possible that many 
treaty regimes do not create institutional mechanisms and merely 
embody obligations.  The reasons are obvious—monitoring 
institutions are costly and many states are unwilling to contribute to 
mechanisms for policing breaches due to self-interested reasons.  In 
such circumstances, there is an enforcement gap, and NGOs, 
individual states, and private actors seek to fill the void.  States 
                                                     
172 E.g., consider the legitimacy of laws criminalizing domestic violence 
created by a parliament comprised largely of domestic abusers. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
  
278 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:1 
might seek to enforce either because they were active in the adoption 
of the treaty or because of a deep commitment to the underlying 
principles behind the rules, or because enforcement coincides with 
their strategic interests in relation to the offender state.  NGOs might 
seek to fill the gap because enforcement coincides with their raison 
d’être, generates support from members or funders, or for other 
reasons.  All these instances of shaming raise legitimacy concerns.  
The third element—processes for establishing breaches of the 
rules and imposing procedural fairness requirements—generates 
significant problems in the shaming context because many of the 
instances of state shaming are bereft of such protections.173  
Considering the empirical evidence of partisanship and 
politicization in the deployment of shaming, critics claim that 
shaming fails the test of fairness.  In situations where NGOs or 
media outlets engage in shaming campaigns, these agencies are not 
bound by legal obligations to ensure that the offender is innocent 
unless proven guilty.  Nor do they have legal obligations to afford 
the offender an opportunity to defend itself adequately, to protect 
against coercion, to take account of precedent or to ensure that 
punishment is proportionate to the wrong committed.  In such 
circumstances, shaming fails the test of legitimacy because the fact 
finding and blame imposing processes are not subject to adequate 
legal safeguards.  The objection is not without merit in relation to 
private actors.  Crucially, these objections about procedural fairness 
do not survive in relation to institutions such as the instant COI The 
COI under the aegis of the international legal system is capable of 
achieving acceptable levels of adjudicative neutrality, giving an 
opportunity for the accused state to defend itself, protecting against 
illegal coercion, and taking account of precedent.  
The final element of the legitimacy claim—lack of fundamental 
rights to limit the power of rulers to make law and enforce them—
manifested typically in domestic constitutions and bolstered by 
judicial review is presented in the shaming context, for example, 
when there is disproportionality in punishment.  In the domestic 
context, one of the limits on the design of punishment is 
proportionality—that punishment fits the crime.  Under this head, 
                                                     
173 See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (“The power 
of public opprobrium, once evoked, is often more pervasive and more penetrating 
than criminal punishment. As the volume of information controlled by the state 
increases, so too does the government's ability to sanction dis-favored activities by 
the simple act of public disclosure.”). 
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punishment is carefully calibrated both in degree and 
administration with designated officials and institutions charged 
with both aspects.  In contrast, shaming operates without any 
control over the degree of punishment or how—and by whom—it is 
to be administered.  Therefore, some offenders are over-punished 
and others are under-punished.174  This is exacerbated by the high 
degrees of uncertainty and unpredictability of both the finding of 
guilt and the administration of punishment.175  
 
3.4. Shaming the State 
 
From the above, it is clear that labels such as “rogue” and 
“pariah” attach at the level of the state.  The idea is based on 
traditional notions of enterprise liability.176  As is the case with 
collectively organised forms of business, such as corporations, 
liability is imposed on the collective body which bears responsibility 
for the actions of its agents.  Enterprise liability externalizes the cost 
of monitoring when the conduct is at micro-level with attendant 
asymmetries of knowledge, resources, and information between 
enforcers and offenders.  The prospect of liability creates incentives 
for the entity to invest in monitoring the conduct of its agents.177  
When agents engage in bad conduct, they are disciplined by their 
superiors and the chain of responsibility for monitoring stops with 
the board in the case of large modern companies.  
It is necessary to shame states because they are the primary 
actors in international law and they have to be held to account for 
commitments they enter into with each other. Enforcement is 
necessary if these commitments are to be regarded as legally 
binding. Therefore, a key test of these commitments is whether there 
is enforcement in practice. Lebovic and Voeten conducted a study 
examining the consequences for states that ratified the ICCPR, 
                                                     
174 James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1088 (1988). 
175 See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid Over Child Sex, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 6, 2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile. 
html (noting that the suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he 
believed to be thirteen years of age following a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering 
reminder of the dangerous consequences of shaming punishments). 
176 David Skeel, supra note 142, at 1829 (examining the effects of shaming a 
corporation). 
177 Id. 
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noting, “[d]uring the Cold War, states that signed and ratified the 
ICCPR treaty were about twice as likely to be shamed by public 
resolution than were states that failed to do so.” Clearly, rather than 
pure partisanship and ad hoc imposition, the treaty system seems to 
be creating a set of contract-type expectations which are then 
enforceable by the imposition of a shame sanction.178  The 
architecture of the treaty defines the legal obligations assumed by 
the ratifying state and provides criteria for other states to make 
evaluative judgements about whether subsequent behavior 
conforms to performance expectations.179 
Shaming is aimed at targeting a state’s self-image because there 
is ample evidence that states deeply care about their self-image and 
invest considerable resources in building and projecting it.  In many 
contexts, this self-image and its external manifestations are in the 
form of a brand and exhibit property-type characteristics.  
Therefore, shaming a state to negatively affect its self-image and 
brand for the international law norm violations committed by its 
officers is akin to imposing a punishment that reduces one’s 
property interests.180  There might be internal and external aspects 
to this shame depending upon the depth of a state’s sense of 
identity.  Under ideal conditions, for a state with a strong sense of 
identity and attendant conceptions of national pride, the imposition 
of a shame sanction triggers internal consequences.181  These might 
                                                     
178 The study by Lebovic and Voeten revealed that members that signed and 
ratified the ICCPR treaty judge target states that also committed to the treaty more 
harshly than states that did not and conclude that shaming practices in the UNHRC 
are based, in part, on a desire to hold states accountable for their commitments . . . 
countries that have signed and ratified the ICCPR treaty do not appear to share 
characteristics (e.g., human rights records) that could explain why the probability 
of a vote to punish a target rises precipitously when both the target and voter are 
parties to the ICCPR treaty. See generally James Lebovic and Erik Voeten, The Politics 
of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 861 (2006). 
179 Id. at 885 
States do not appear to get favorable treatment from the commission 
merely by paying lip service to important principles. To the contrary, the 
acts of signing and ratifying treaties or achieving formal membership 
within IOs seem not to contribute directly toward reputation-building in 
the international community. If these agreements and memberships 
matter, it is in raising expectations when members of the community 
evaluate the conduct of other states. Simply put, states expect others to 
deliver on their promises. 
180 E.g., a fine. 
181 Thomas Risse & Stephen Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and 
Domestic Change: Conclusions, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 234, 254 (1999). 
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be manifested by exercises in self-reflection,182 formalized 
institutional processes aimed at establishing the truth and 
identifying offenders,183 structural reforms,184 corrective legislation, 
punishment for offenders,185 reparations for victims,186 and 
apologies.187  In contrast to these situations, states might engage in a 
refutation of shaming campaigns, and the shaming is therefore 
confined to extracting external consequences.188 Under either 
scenario, shaming the state creates incentives for better monitoring 
and law abidance.  In some cases, such incentives might result in 
greater investment in promoting better conduct, e.g., by ratifying 
                                                     
182 E. Dresler-Hawke & J. H.Liu, Collective Shame and the Positioning of German 
National Identity, 32 PSICOLOGÍA  POLÍTICA 131–53 (2006); Michael Johns et al., 
Ashamed to Be an American? The Role of Identification in Predicting Vicarious Shame for 
Anti-Arab Prejudice After 9-11, (2005) 4 SELF AND IDENTITY, 331–348. 
183 Day of Shame for British Army: Shocking Brutality Uncovered by Inquiry, 
LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.standard.co.uk/news/ 
day-of-shame-for-british-army-shocking-brutality-uncovered-by-inquiry-
6441146.html. 
184 Ryan Goodman, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, 
Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE LJ 983, 995 (2004). 
185 Following an abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, several U.S. 
military personnel serving at the prison were convicted on multiple charges by 
court martial and incarcerated, Graner Gets 10 years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 16, 2005),  http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6795956/ns/world_news-
mideast_n_africa/t/graner-gets-years-abu-ghraib-abuse/; Liz Beavers, England 
Back in Mineral County, CUMBERLAND TIMES (Mar. 25, 2007), http://www.times-
news.com/england-back-in-mineral-county/article_5919dee3-e19a-50c4-8ac8-
f9c7b408c07d.html . 
186 For example, Maher Arar, a Syrian-Canadian who was deported from the 
United States to Syria after Canadian officials falsely suspected him of terrorist 
activities, was awarded $10.5 million in damages from the Canadian government 
following a public inquiry. Josh Tapper, Barack Obama Should Apologize to Maher 
Arar, Rights Groups Say, TORONTO STAR (May 22, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/ 
news/canada/2012/05/22/barack_obama_should_apologize_to_maher_arar_rig
hts_groups_say.html. 
187 Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, Apology to the Stolen 
Generations (Feb. 13, 2008), available 
athttp://www.dfat.gov.au/indigenous/apology-to-stolen-
generations/national_apology.html. 
188 Libya’s oil industry, for example, was hit hard by UN sanctions imposed 
after the bombing of two commercial airplanes in the late 1980s. By 2001, the total 
cost of these sanctions to the Libyan economy was estimated to be $18 billion by the 
World Bank and $33 billion by Libyan government. See Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who 
Came in from the Cold, FOREIGN AFF.62, 64 (2001). However, sanctions against the Ian 
Smith regime in Rhodesia succeeded in making the country wholly dependent on 
trade with apartheid-era South Africa. Once Western countries managed to disrupt 
that trading relationship, the Rhodesian economy was brought to its knees. Robert 
O. Matthews, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement(1989-1990), 45 
INT’L J. 292, 302, 327 et seq. (1990). 
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international law instruments; bonding or improving the training of 
police or military personnel; employing more lawyers in the defence 
hierarchy; preventing or employing anti-corruption staff and 
human rights commissions; and monitoring, while in other cases it 
translates into greater resources for punitive enforcement, e.g., more 
police, courts, and prisons.  The net result from the operation of 
these incentives is that a state acts rationally to minimize the 
probability of being punished because it cares about the negative 
consequences of shaming.  
The empirical evidence is less clear. Other things being equal, 
shaming sanctions appear to be imposed less frequently upon richer 
states than on poorer states.189  Authors who have studied shaming 
by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (“UNHCR”) 
write that despite there being eleven attempts at censuring China 
between 1991 and 2001, none proved to be successful.190  The study 
examined other variables that predicted when a state would become 
a target for shaming at UNHRC.  States seen to be more cooperative 
than others or those that made a greater contribution to common 
objectives were, unsurprisingly, less likely to be targeted by other 
states.191  For example, the authors found that “regardless of their 
rights records, states that failed to participate in peacekeeping 
missions in the prior year ran about twice the risk of being targeted 
by the commission as did participating states. [Similarly,] states that 
vote in the UN [General Assembly] only half the time are about 
twice as likely to be targeted than are states that vote all the time.”192  
The difficulty of disparities in punishment actions relative to power 
                                                     
189 During the Cold War, a state with average capabilities was able to escape 
sanctions or to keep the charges against it confidential 44% of the time; a state with 
capabilities one standard deviation above the mean (e.g., Austria or Morocco) 
avoided more than confidential treatment 66% of the time. The effect is only slightly 
less pronounced in the post-Cold War period; the values are 25% and 42%, 
respectively. See James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The 
Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INTL’ STUD. Q. 861, 
878 (2006). 
190 As the ability of Saudi Arabia and China to escape condemnation indicates, 
there is still good reason to be suspicious of the impartiality of the UNHCR’s public 
shaming process. Id. at 884. 
191 In the Cold War period, a state with a perfect attendance record in the UNGA 
is less than half as likely to have a public resolution adopted against it as is a country 
that participates only 50%of the time . . . targeted states that faithfully vote in the 
UNGA escape without punishment or with confidential consideration an estimated 
54% of the time, whereas a state that participates only half the time that it is eligible 
can make the same claim only 13% of the time. Id. at 877–78. 
192 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5
  
2015] ‘RECALCITRANT’ STATES 283 
and influence is not necessarily a problem as long as punishment is 
attempted—our claim is that shaming has the potential to affect state 
behavior in ways that matter for law, not that all states are punished 
equally all of the time.  The ultimate success of prosecution and 
degree of punishment imposed is a function of a number of factors, 
not least of which is relative power and resources—no different 
from traditional law enforcement. 
A complicating factor for shaming at the state level is its 
politicization.193  This is particularly problematic at the multilateral 
organization level when there is capture by partisan interests. One 
study of practice at UNHRC found that during the Cold War, 
“political alignment with the [U.S.] greatly increased the prospect 
that countries were subject to severe sanctions. Targeted states that 
consistently voted with the [U.S.] were virtually assured (a 
probability of .93) of being sanctioned by a public resolution.”194  
This declined following the end of the Cold War, but “states were 
more likely to favour countries with similar alliances and to oppose 
countries with dissimilar alliances.  This conclusion is further 
reinforced by the impact of a convergence in domestic ideology.”195  
 
3.5. Shaming the Regime 
 
Shaming the regime is preferable to shaming the state when the 
latter is either not congruent with blame for the wrong or when 
shaming the state is not effective.  Several reasons exist for this: first, 
as illustrated by the North Korean example, the relationship 
between the offending public officials and the citizens of the state is 
likely to be quite attenuated.  To be sure, shaming the entire North 
Korean state in such circumstances is both unfair and ineffective.  It 
is unfair because shaming punishes innocent people who are victims 
of the actions of the regime and ineffective because the citizens are 
unlikely to experience shame for illegal actions that they did not 
commit.  In other words, the citizen is likely to behave more as a 
victim than as an offender and shaming is wasted.  
                                                     
193 Id. (“foreign policy positions, as measured by votes in the UNGA, has a 
significant and substantial effect on the decision by a state to withhold punishment 
of another (hence, the negative coefficients) in both the Cold War and post-Cold 
War periods.”). 
194 Lebovic and Voeten, supra note 18, at 876. 
195 Id. 
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Some of these difficulties in shaming the state as an entity can be 
resolved by shaming the regime instead.  Even so, fairness requires 
that shame should be restricted to the individual offenders rather 
than the entire government.  
One response might be to limit shaming to the ruler when the 
decision is made by him or at his behest.  This has the virtue of 
protecting innocent actors from undeserved punishment. States that 
are ruled by ideational figures, personality cults, and dynastic 
families are prime targets.  A totalitarian regime such as North 
Korea, where executive power vests in one individual or a 
dictatorial regime, provides a good example. The work of the COI is 
an illustration of shaming the regime because of specific findings 
made against the Supreme Leader.  
In an ideal scenario, shaming triggers both an internal and 
external response in the ruler; internal in the sense that the ruler 
experiences moral shame and undertakes corrective action to punish 
wrongdoers, compensate victims and prevent future occurrences 
because he genuinely believes that the conduct is wrongful.196  In 
less ideal conditions, the response might be purely external: faced 
with the shame sanction, the ruler takes some action to assuage 
external actors while continuing to covertly condone or ignore the 
wrong.197  These externally directed actions might be accompanied 
by denials of any wrongdoing.198  North Korea has exhibited these 
reactions at several points in its history including after the 
publication of the COI Report.  
Notably, shaming the ruler comes with its own set of unintended 
consequences.  A rational ruler might be assumed to weigh the cost 
from being shamed when acting on the international plane.  The 
ruler must ask if the cost he is likely to incur from successful 
shaming activity by third parties outweighs the benefits conferred 
from the act.  If the cost exceeds the benefits, a rational ruler will 
forego the action.  Logically, the shaming activity depends on the 
wrong act being detected.  Therefore, rulers might attempt to hide 
information about wrongs committed by themselves or their lower 
level functionaries, calculating that if the acts do not attract public 
                                                     
196 See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International 
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, MICH. ST. L. REV.,785, 793-94 (2007).  
197 Bahrain’s Human-Rights Report: the King’s Risky Move, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 
26, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21540304. 
198 Sri Lanka’s Empty Promises and Denial of Rights Crisis Exposed at UN, AMNESTY 
INT’L., (Nov. 1, 2012), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ 
news/2012/11/sri-lanka-s-empty-promises-and-denial-rights-crisis-exposed-un/. 
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scrutiny there is less likelihood of shaming.199  Thus, one of the 
unintended consequences of shaming the ruler might be to create 
incentives for suppressing information about wrongs committed by 
lower level officials. 
It is not clear that all rulers are equally responsive to shaming; 
and some rulers are more responsive than others.  For example, 
rulers with strong claims to moral or ethical leadership,200 rulers 
whose grip on power is infirm,201 those who need good reputations 
to join regional associations or trade groups,202 those who need to 
attract international investment,203 those who need loans from 
                                                     
199 Access to Information in Mexico: Migration and National Security, 
FREEDOMINFO.ORG (June 28 2012), http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/06/access-
to-information-in-mexico-migration-and-national-security/. 
200 Religious leaders, in particular, such as the Pope, might be susceptible to 
shaming. See Cathy L. Grossman, Sex Abuse Scandal Drives Down Pope Benedict's U.S. 
Approval Ratings, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/ 
communities/Religion/post/2010/03/pope-benedict-sex-abuse-survey-ratings-
fall/1 (noting that opinions of religious leaders are documented and published); See 
also Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement to 
the 29th Session of the Human Rights Council by the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (June 15, 2015), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16074&LangID=E.  , (naming 
states involved in possible human rights violations). 
201 See FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG, NATO'S ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST: AN 
ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING, EAPC-NATO INDIVIDUAL FELLOWSHIP 
REPORT 1998-2000 64, available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/ 
schimmelfennig.pdf 
 . . . the opponents and skeptics of enlargement within the alliance could 
not openly oppose and block enlargement either without experiencing 
genuine cognitive dissonance and shame or without risking to reveal a 
hypocritical, self-serving attitude toward the alliance's norms and mission 
and to lose their credibility and reputation as members of the community 
in good standing. 
202 See György Szondi, The Role and Challenges of Country Branding in Transition 
Countries: The Central and Eastern European Experience, 3 PLACE BRANDING AND PUB. 
DIPL. 8, 10 (2007) 
Central European countries' most important foreign policy goals were to 
join NATO and the European Union, two 'superbrands'. Countries in 
transition rely on the moral, financial and political support of more 
developed regions or nations, called 'centre nations', such as the Western 
European countries. The less developed or transitional countries are often 
situated on the 'periphery'. In their orientation the transitional countries 
are moving from the periphery towards the centre position and the 
function of branding is to support and justify this 'move' and demonstrate 
that these countries are worthy of the centre nations' support. Branding 
can also be interpreted as the periphery's call for legitimisation. 
203 Libya, for example, following a decades-long shame campaign 
spearheaded by the United States and United Kingdom, eventually agreed to 
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multilateral lending agencies,204 and those who need support from 
allies205 are probably most responsive to shame sanctions.  In 
contrast, rulers who resist external norms,206 have established 
reputations for denouncing the dominant international actors,207 or 
                                                     
extradite two suspects in the PanAm bombing and to pay compensation to the 
victim’s families. This action permitted Libya to normalize its aviation industry and 
to attract much needed foreign investment to fully exploit its oilfields. John H. 
Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for U.S. 
Companies, 38(2) CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 413, 451 (2005); Jad Mouawad, Libya Tempts 
Executives With Big Oil Reserves, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/02/ business/libya-tempts-executiveswith-
big-oil-reserves.html?_r=0.  
204 In 1994, the World Bank obligated Burkina Faso to “[i]ncorporate a pledge 
in its policy framework paper to curb female genital mutilation.” Canan Gunduz, 
Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a Consistent Approach 18 
DESTIN STUD. INST., WORKING PAPER SERIES 3) (2004), available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP49.pdf. Two 
years later, Burkina Faso criminalized female genital mutilation and formed a 
national committee charged with combatting the practice. Heidi Jones, Nafissatou 
Diop, Ian Askew, & Inoussa Kaboré, Female Genital Cutting Practices in Burkina Faso 
and Mali and Their Negative Health Outcomes, 30 STUD. FAMILY PLAN. 219, 220 (1999), 
available at http://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/councilarticles/ 
sfp/SFP303Jones.pdf.  
205 Ulrike Demmer & Christoph Schult, Unreliable Partners? Germany’s 
Reputation in NATO Has Hit Rock Bottom, SPIEGEL, (May 17, 2012) 
http://www.spiegel. de/international/world/criticism-of-germany-s-military-
role-in-the-nato-alliance-a-833503.html. 
206 In 2008, Robert Mugabe was stripped of an honorary British knighthood 
that had been bestowed in 1994, as a mark of revulsion at the abuse of human rights 
and abject disregard for the democratic process in Zimbabwe over which President 
Mugabe has presided.  Mugabe is Stripped of Knighthood as Mark of Revulsion, THE 
SCOTSMAN (Jun. 25, 2008), http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/        mugabe-is-
stripped-of-knighthood-as-a-mark-of-revulsion-1-1077561# axzz3o471H8rT. In 
close temporal proximity, Mugabe was stripped of several honorary degrees he had 
been awarded by Western universities in the 1980s. Paul Kelbie, Edinburgh 
University Revokes Mugabe Degree, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 15, 2007), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/15/highereducation.internationaled
ucationnews; Michigan State Revokes Mugabe’s Honorary Degree, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 
16, 2008), available at http://diverseeducation.com/article/11685/. 
207 Hugo Chavez is a good example of such a figure. At a press conference on 
August 2, 2012, Chavez denounced European nations for funding Syrian rebels and 
terrorists in the ongoing conflict in that country. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez 
Criticizes West Over Syria, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/aug/02/venezuela-hugo-chavez-syria-video; 
Chavez, Ahmadinejad Denounce West's Imperialist Aggression in Libya, Syria, JAGRAN 
POST (Aug. 17, 2011), http://post.jagran.com/chavez-ahmadinejad-denounce-
wests-imperialist-aggression-in-libya-syria-1313592746. In 2006, Chavez famously 
referred to then-US-President George Bush as “the devil” during a speech to the 
UN General Assembly, taking the opportunity in follow-up interviews to criticize 
the Second Iraq War and Washington-back capitalist reforms in Latin America. Tim 
Padgett, Chavez: Bush Has Called Me Worse Things, TIME MAGAZINE (Sept. 22, 2006), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5
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are pursuing a different ideology, which provides internal 
justifications for their actions, are unlikely to be responsive to 
shaming.208  Regimes and rulers with economic or political 
importance generate their own difficulties.209  Under such 
circumstances, a ruler is likely to be less responsive to shame 
sanctions because of the strategic or economic importance of his 
country.210  Even so, unless the ruler has egregiously criminal 
tendencies,211 he will be responsive to shaming on a scale that varies 
from weakly responsive to strongly responsive.  If the ruler enjoys 
widespread domestic support and has a weak opposition,212 or is a 
                                                     
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1538296,00.html# 
ixzz2G6BzUvhc.   
208 For example, the Taliban destroyed the irreplaceable Bamiyan Buddhas in 
2001, despite an international outcry in which several countries, including Iran, 
offered to purchase the historical statues, due to a “religious obligation to destroy 
idols.” Alex Spillius, Taliban Ignore All Appeals to Save Buddhas, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 
5, 2001), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/                  
afghanistan/1325119/Taliban-ignore-all-appeals-to-save-Buddhas.html. 
209 China and Russia have both been able to use their permanent seats on the 
Security Council to avoid action on Tibet and Chechnya, respectively. Despite the 
personal popularity for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause in many Western 
States, China’s rising importance has ensured that the issue has slipped off the 
international agenda. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: CHINA 
AND TIBET – THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2000), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/asia/china3.html (describing China’s 
persistence in curbing basic freedoms despite domestic and foreign pressure). 
210 See, e.g., David Eimer, China Dismisses US Criticism of its Human Rights 
Record, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/       
worldnews/asia/china/8441374/China-Dismisses-US-Criticism-of-its-human-
rights-record.html (noting how China fired back at the United States for criticizing 
its human rights record); World Report 2015: China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet. 
211 Examples of this type of ruler include Idi Amin of Uganda and Pol Pot of 
Cambodia. Idi Amin’s rule has been described as “a synonym for barbarity” and 
the man himself as “possessed of an animal magnetism” which he wielded with 
“sadistic skill”. Amin attributed God-like powers to himself, and exhibited such 
irrational behavior that most foreign leaders who had contact with him came to the 
concluded that he was, in fact, clinically insane. Amin was ruthless in dealing with 
real and imagined political opponents and his reign caused the deaths of an 
estimated 300,000 people. Patrick Keatley, Obituary: Idi Amin, THE GUARDIAN(Aug. 
18, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/18/                       
guardianobituaries. Amin often acted based on erratic reasons, and via sadistic 
methods, e.g., beating to death with sledge hammers. Death of a Buffoon and Killer, 
NEW SCOTSMAN, (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www.scotsman.com/news/                     
international/death-of-a-despot-buffoon-and-killer-1-1292740.  
212 For example, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Support for Mugabe’s chief 
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change, fell from 38% in 2010 to only 
20% in mid-2012. Lydia Polgreen, Less Support for Opposition in Zimbabwe, Study 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/ 
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dictator without any resistance, he will be weakly responsive at best.  
Similarly, if the ruler thrives on challenging the dominant 
international structure or is leading a revolutionary government 
fighting against claimed injustices perpetrated by foreign actors, 
shame has little chance of succeeding.213  To the contrary, in such 
cases, shaming by international actors serves to establish that ruler’s 
reputation for fearlessness and in some cases can be effectively 
utilized to buttress his or her position among his domestic 
constituency.214 
 
3.6. Shaming North Korea 
 
International human rights groups have engaged in shaming 
campaigns against North Korea for a long time.  This is despite the 
realization that the nature of the regime makes any prospect of 
engaging with it in order to achieve change rather remote.215  When 
                                                     
world/africa/support-for-opposition-in-zimbabwe-declines-study-shows.html?_ 
r=0. The MDC has faced many challenges, including attempting to pacify a diverse 
supporting base of its own and a leadership weakened by accusations of treason 
and Mugabe’s populist policies, such as accelerated land redistribution. Chris 
Maroleng, Situation Report: Zimbabwe Movement for Democratic Change, INST. FOR 
SECURITY STUD. (May 3, 2004), available at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/ 
jspui/bitstream/123456789/31353/1/ZIMMAY04.pdf?1. 
213 Slobodan Milosevic, for example, always positioned himself as the 
defender of the Serbian people against foreign aggression. In a 2001 BBC interview, 
following his extradition to face war crimes charges at The Hague, Milosevic’s wife 
Mira Markovic stated, “I don't feel any shame. On the contrary, I'm proud of my 
people and I am sure that throughout its history it pursued—as far as wars are 
concerned—a defence policy.” Mrs. Markovic blamed Western powers for the 
bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and claimed that Mr. Milosevic was an 
inspiration to “many poor, small and humiliated nations throughout the world.” 
Wife Hails Milosevic the 'Freedom Fighter', BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2001),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1529200.stm. Milosevic himself phoned Fox 
News from his cell phone to give a live interview stating, “I’m proud of everything 
I did in defending my country and my people.” MilosevicGives TV Interview from 
Cell, BBC NEWS(Aug. 24, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/                       
europe/1507660.stm. 
214 John F Dickerson, Why Bush Is Giving Schroeder the Cold Shoulder, TIME 
MAGAZINE(Sept. 30, 2002),  http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,356168,00.html; Dan Collins, Schroeder Claims Narrow Victory, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 20, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/schroeder-claims-narrow-
victory/; Steven Komarow, Schroeder Sticks to Opposing War with Iraq, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-23-
germany_x.htm.  
215 As a Human Rights Watch official noted in 2011, in reference to Kim Jong-
Il 
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the current Supreme Leader assumed power following the death of 
his father, the International Coalition to Stop Crime against 
Humanity in North Korea addressed a letter to him utilizing 
language geared at triggering self-reflection: “we believe [you 
could] enhance your leadership, improve the standing of your 
country and benefit your people.”216  The Coalition pointed out that 
over 200,000 people were being detained in prison or labor camps 
and that “human rights of the vast majority of the 24.5 million North 
Korean people are routinely violated, despite the fact that the DPRK 
government has ratified and is therefore bound to respect the rights 
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.”217  It “appeal[ed to him] to change course at this critical 
juncture of North Korean history, just a few months before the April 
15, 2012, celebration of the 100th year of the birth of . . . Kim Il-
Sung.”218  Human Rights Watch repeatedly called for the 
establishment of a UN commission of inquiry: “North Korea’s 
defiance of the UN Human Rights Council’s mandates and 
mechanisms should not be allowed to stand.  It’s time for the UN to 
take the next step, and ratchet up the pressure by [setting up a 
COI].”219   
                                                     
The conventional wisdom is that he would not have cared, that talking 
more in public about human rights, or pressing North Korean leaders 
directly on issues like labor camps, would have done nothing for the 
country’s people, while making diplomacy even more difficult. This sense 
of futility became another reason to push North Korea’s horrors from the 
forefront of our minds. Kim Jong Il became more often a subject of ridicule 
from the outside world, with his bouffant haircut, and retro-Soviet 
propaganda slogans, than of condemnation—his wackiness was a 
distraction and thus also a source of protection . . .  
Tom Malinowski, Is There Any Way To Help the People of North Korea, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/22/there-any-
way-help-people-north-korea. 
216 Letter from human rights coalition to Kim Jong-Un, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 
8, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/08/joint-letter-supreme-
commander-kim-jong-un. 
217 Id. The letter also noted that many were starving despite the ability of the 
government to provide food and that the regime was accused of committing crimes 
against humanity. 
218 Id. 
219 North Korea: UN Should Investigate Crimes Against Humanity: New Leader Kim 
Jong-Un Indicates No Change on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/north-korea-un-should-investigate-
crimes-against-humanity. 
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As previously noted, one of the functions of the naming and 
shaming strategies employed by international human rights 
organizations is to put pressure on non-offender states and 
international organizations to take action against the offender state.  
This is clearly the only avenue in situations such as North Korea 
because of the slim prospects that the regime will undertake reforms 
and the non-existence of domestic human rights groups that could 
leverage international pressure to destabilize the regime.  The efforts 
of international advocacy groups did result in generating pressure 
on states and International Organizations.  For instance, the Human 
Rights Council adopted a resolution against North Korea in 2012 
without a single state’s opposition.220  This is significant when 
viewed against the inability of that body to adopt consensual 
positions against states like Libya and Burma, which also had poor 
records.221  North Korea’s response to such resolutions is 
unequivocal rejection. 222  
Human Rights Watch campaigned for the European Union to 
take action,223 “welcome[ing] the fact that [it] has co-sponsored a 
number of resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly and 
Human Rights Council criticizing human rights violations in North 
Korea.”224  The European Parliament adopted a resolution in 2012 
                                                     
220 For instance, in 2010, a Human Rights Council resolution saw Indonesia, 
China, Russia, Cuba, and Egypt being opposed. Indonesia in Bad Company Defending 
North Korean Rights Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/31/indonesia-bad-company-defending-
north-korean-rights-abuses. 
221 A Human Rights Watch official stated “The Human Rights Council’s 
unopposed condemnation of North Korea’s horrific human rights record is ground-
breaking.” UN Human Rights Council: North Korea Condemnation Goes Unopposed, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/ 
23/un-human-rights-council-north-korea-condemnation-goes-unopposed. 
222 See Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Members Want North Korea in International 
Court for Rights Abuses, REUTERS(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2014/12/18/us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0JW24420141218 
("’My delegation totally rejects the resolution,’ North Korean delegate An Myong 
Hun told the assembly. ‘It is a product of a political plot and confrontation.’"). 
223 The EU director at Human Rights Watch stated, “The European Union 
needs to step up its action in response to the North Korean regime's outrageous 
patterns of human rights violations . . . Establishing an independent international 
commission of inquiry would be a good first step.” EU: Try to Improve Human Rights 
in North Korea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 14, 2010), https://www.hrw. 
org/news/2010/06/14/eu-try-improve-human-rights-north-korea. 
224 Letter from human rights coalition to EU Foreign Ministers, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (June 14, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/letter-eu-
foreign-ministers-concerning-european-union-policies-north-korean-human-ri. 
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“[reiterating] its call for the DPRK to put an immediate end to the 
ongoing grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations 
perpetrated against its own people, which are causing North 
Koreans to flee their country; [and urging DPRK] to act upon the 
recommendations of the report of the [Periodic Review], and as a 
first step to allow inspection of all types of detention facility by 
independent international experts.”225  In November 2014, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution co-authored by the EU and 
Japan and co-sponsored by 62 member states. 226  The EU and Japan 
are also working on another resolution for adoption by the UN 
Human Rights Council in early 2015 to refer the DPRK for 
prosecution before the ICC for crimes against humanity.227 
Other states, most notably the United States, have attempted to 
respond to information about the abuses in the DPRK.  At the UN, 
Ambassador Power of the US noted the “growing consensus among 
Council members and UN Member States that the widespread and 
systematic human rights violations being committed by the North 
Korean government are not only deplorable in their own right, but 
also pose a threat to international peace and security.”228 
                                                     
225 European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2012 on the situation of North 
Korean refugees. Council Directive 2012/2655, O.J. 2012/2655(RSP), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+ 
P7-TA-2012-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. (The resolution recorded that  
 . . . as a direct result of the policies of the DPRK . . . it is estimated that 
over the years up to 400,000 North Koreans have fled the country, many 
of whom are living in neighbouring China as ‘illegal migrants . . . 
according to eye-witness reports, refugees who are forcibly returned to 
North Korea are systematically subjected to torture, imprisoned in 
concentration camps and may even be executed, pregnant women are 
allegedly forced to abort, and babies of Chinese fathers are at risk of being 
killed; . . .  satellite images and various accounts . . . substantiate allegations 
that the DPRK operates at least six concentration camps and numerous ‘re-
education’ camps, possibly housing up to 200 000 prisoners, most of them 
political.)  
226 Report of the Third Committee, 69th Sess., Nov. 2014, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1 (2014), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ 
doc.asp?symbol=A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1. 
227 Hyo-jin Kim, EU and Japan Submit N. Korea Human Rights Resolution, 
NATIONAL(Mar. 19, 2015), available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ 
nation/2015/03/116_175560.html. 
228 The Ambassador stated: “[i]f you have not watched any of the hours of 
victims’ testimony, or read from the hundreds of pages of transcripts from the 
Commission’s public hearings, I urge you to do so. They show North Korea for 
what it is: a living nightmare.” Samantha Powers, U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations, Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, at a UN Security Council Session on the 
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3.7. Shaming is an Effective Punishment 
 
There is reason to believe that even an offender state that has 
been labelled as a “recalcitrant” or “deviant” is responsive to 
shaming.  All states care about their self-image and external 
reputation.  The first is important to a state to ensure its legitimacy 
and protect its identity and existence as a physical and legal 
construct.  It is what binds citizens to the state and generates 
obedience to laws that underpin society.  The second is important 
both for instrumental and non-instrumental reasons.  Reputation is 
central to a state’s desirability as a partner in cooperation with other 
states and business entities.  This is manifested by the willingness of 
states to enter into treaties, provide loans, sponsor entry into clubs, 
etc. A reputation for law abidance and commitment to international 
norms is also crucial for attracting foreign businesses, much needed 
technological investment, and migrant labor.  Therefore, it is no 
surprise that all states closely guard their reputation and react with 
aggressive measures at efforts to tarnish it.  This explains much of 
why states undertake the costly effort of explaining their actions as 
being consistent with international law, and producing detailed 
rebuttals and legal opinions seeking to convince domestic and 
international audiences when they are accused of breaching 
international obligations. 
States as powerful as the United States and as recalcitrant as 
North Korea both exhibit evidence of such behaviour.  As elaborated 
by Ambassador Powers, “ . . . the DPRK’s response [to the COI 
report] . . . shows that it is sensitive to criticism of its human rights 
record . . . North Korea has tried . . . to distract attention from the 
report, to delegitimize its findings, and to avoid scrutiny . . . [The] 
second argument for exerting additional pressure is that when 
regimes warn of deadly reprisals against countries that condemn 
their atrocities . . . we need [to]stand up and not back down.  
Dictators who see threats are an effective tool for silencing the 
international community tend to be emboldened and not placated.  
And that holds true not only for the North Korean regime, but for 
human rights violators around the world who are watching how the 
                                                     
Human Rights Situation in North Korea, December 22, 2014, available at 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/12/20141223312526.
html#ixzz3XKUPrmBx. 
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Security Council responds . . . ”229  Further, DPRK officials have been 
lobbying states in the months after the publication of the COI report 
and offering unprecedented concessions in an attempt to dilute 
adverse consequences.  For instance, they raised the possibility of 
the Special Rapporteur visiting North Korea.230  Although the DPRK 
has ceased its lobbying efforts for the present, these responses are 
indicative of its recognition of the consequences of shaming.  The 
COI’s report lists a number of recommendations that present a way 
forward for the regime to move from recognition to rehabilitation 
and reintegration if it were to accept the proposals and undertake 
consequent steps. 
Aside from the offender state, the COI’s work has had powerful 
consequences for other states because they can no longer claim a lack 
of knowledge or take cover under the plea that there is no proof.  
This leaves them open to secondary shaming by other states and by 
domestic groups including local human rights organisations that are 
part of transnational advocacy networks.  That such secondary 
shaming has some potency is evidenced by the recent conduct of 
Russia and China. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The international community cannot continue to remain a mute 
spectator to the horrific abuses of human rights in North Korea.  The 
extraordinary testimonies of victims documented by the COI have 
ensured that it is no longer possible to disclaim knowledge of the 
severe breach of international law obligations by the DPRK.  
Equally, we acknowledge that the current international legal system 
offers limited potential for direct action in order to hold the regime 
accountable for its actions.  However, this does not mean that the 
international community is powerless against such a recalcitrant 
                                                     
229 The Ambassador said, “The DPRK ramped up its propaganda machine, 
publishing its own sham report on its human rights record, and claiming “the 
world’s most advantageous human rights system.” [it] tried to smear the 
reputations of hundreds of people . . . calling them “human scum bereft of even an 
iota of conscience.” Id.  
230 See North Korea Suspends Human Rights Charm Offensive, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/11/north-korea-
suspends-human-rights-talks (“North Korean diplomats also recently met the UN 
special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, Marzuki Darusman, for the 
first time and signalled that they could allow him to visit Pyongyang if references 
to the criminal court were removed from the draft.”).  
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state.  Rather, the enormous attention devoted to the COI’s report 
since its publication illustrates the interest in applying international 
law norms to such states, assessing responsibility for actions that 
contravene those norms, and the desire to punish breaches. As 
noted, both the assessment of responsibility and the imposition of 
punishment are problematic in the context of recalcitrant states. 
Previously underappreciated alternative sanctions such as shaming 
might offer enforcement potential for international law in these 
circumstances.  The work of the COI is an excellent example of how 
the objections typically levelled against shaming can be overcome.  
As discussed previously, shaming by the COI overcomes the 
objections of lack of authority and legitimacy.  The COI possesses 
authority because it was created pursuant to a formal legal process 
and is conferred with a specific legal mandate.  Shaming by the COI 
is legitimate because (i) the international legal obligations 
voluntarily assumed by the state pass the test of legality; (ii) there is 
an institutional process to assess facts and apportion responsibility; 
(iii) there are adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that the 
offender is entitled to due process, that the adjudication is neutral, 
follows precedent, and conforms to accepted standards of proof; and 
(iv) there are adequate fundamental rights protections for both the 
making of the underlying legal rules and the punishment of the 
offender.  As discussed, shaming has the effect of persuading the 
violator to undertake corrective action.  Even if the regime in the 
DPRK is impervious to such corrective measures, shaming can be 
deployed against other states in the international community as a 
secondary sanction to force them to acknowledge the wrongs and 
take action either unilaterally or in a coordinated fashion.  As 
previously noted, the familiar objections to secondary shaming—
that there is no due process, that facts are not properly established, 
that the fact-finder is not neutral and independent, etc.—are not 
tenable when a COI has issued a report supported by evidence 
documenting grave violations of human rights.  Under such 
circumstances, shame sanctions ought to be deployed against states 
such as Russia which hold influence over the DPRK.  Faced with the 
threat of shaming and related adverse consequences for reputation 
and important economic interests, such states will react as typical 
targets of secondary shaming do—by putting pressure on the 
primary violator, the DPRK, to change its behavior and comply with 
its legal obligations.  A proper appreciation of shaming illustrates 
the powerful role that the institution of the COI can play in 
international law. 
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